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PRECONCEPTION TORT LAW IN AN ERA OF
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: APPLYING A
NEXUS TEST FOR DUTY
Matthew Browne*
INTRODUCTION
For five years, a husband and wife have been trying, without
success, to conceive a child. They have thought about adopting but
would prefer, if possible, to have a their own biological child. The
couple undergo testing at a fertility clinic and discover that the
husband's sperm count is extremely low. Specialists at the clinic tell
the husband and wife not to be discouraged, because there is a
procedure, already used by thousands of couples, that can help them
conceive. Clinic doctors can harvest eggs from the wife and sperm
from the husband for in vitro fertilization (IVF). Since the husband's
sperm count is too low for ordinary IVF, doctors will assist the process
by injecting a single sperm cell into one of the eggs to create a zygote
for implantation in the wife's uterus.'
The couple choose to undergo the procedure, and fertilization is
achieved. Unfortunately, the egg is damaged during the sperm
injection process, and the child suffers birth defects. The parents sue
on behalf of themselves for the added costs of raising a child with
birth defects and on behalf of the child for personal injuries arising
out of the fertility clinic's negligence. The court allows the parents'
claim but dismisses the child's claim on three grounds: first, the child
has no cause of action in negligence because the clinic doctors did not
owe a duty of care to a person who was not yet conceived at the time
of their negligent act (penetration of the egg with the injection
pipette);2 second, even if there were a duty of care, the child cannot
* This Note is dedicated to my wife, Rosemary, and my children, Sarah and
Christopher, for all their love and support. I would like to express my deep gratitude
to Professor Benjamin Zipursky, who provided invaluable guidance, insight, and
encouragement throughout the writing of this Note. I would also like to thank Erik
Parens of The Hastings Center for advising me about assisted reproductive
technologies that implicate preconception negligence.
1. For a discussion of intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), the procedure
upon which this hypothetical is based, see infra notes 352-61 and accompanying text.
2- See, e.g., Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. 1981)
(holding that there is no preconception duty of care even where harm to a later-
conceived child is foreseeable).
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claim that she suffered a net injury because the doctors conferred
upon her the offsetting benefit of life itself;3 and third, creating a duty
to future persons is a policy matter of broad implications that is best
left to the legislature.4
The above hypothetical both illustrates some of the legal obstacles
faced by plaintiffs injured as a result of negligent acts occurring prior
to conception and demonstrates how emerging reproductive
technologies may pose risks of preconception harm. Preconception
torts have been the basis for numerous state and federal cases over
the past three decades. Although there were only a handful of
preconception claims before the 1970s, this area of tort law has been
expanding in recent years for at least four reasons: first, improved
medical techniques for tracing injuries to causes predating
conception;6 second, the expanding use of medical procedures that
have the potential to injure a woman in such a way that a
subsequently-conceived child might be injured;7 third, the discovery of
harm from drugs, especially diethylstilbestrol (DES), which can cause
injury both to individuals exposed in utero and to their children;' and
fourth, human exposure to toxic substances that have the potential to
alter chromosome structure in parents, resulting in deformities in their
offspring.9 Intentional manipulation of human reproductive cells
apparently has not yet given rise to a valid preconception tort claim, 0
but this eventuality is all but assured in an age of rapidly developing
genetic and assisted reproductive technology."
3. See infra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
4. See Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 788.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See infra Part I.B.l.b-c; see Elizabeth F. Collins, An Overview and Analysis:
Prenatal Torts, Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongfid Death, and Wrongful
Birth: Time for a New Framework, 22 J. Fam. L. 677, 677 (1983-84); see generally
Deborah K. Andrews, Recognizing a Cause of Action for Preconception Torts in Light
of Medical and Legal Advancements Regarding the Unborn, 53 UMKC L. Rev. 78, 80-
93 (1984) (reviewing prenatal and preconception tort cases arising out of advances in
medical knowledge); cf Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating
to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 554, 554-62 (1962) (describing how advances in
medical science paved the way for prenatal tort causes of action).
7. See infra Part I.B.l.a.
8. See infra Part I.B.2; see also John B. Maynard, Note, Third-Generation-DES
Claims, 27 New Eng. L. Rev. 241,241-42 (1992).
9. See infra Part I.B.4.
10. The word "manipulation" is used narrowly here to mean the physical
disruption or alteration of reproductive cells, as opposed to the mere handling of
reproductive cells that is necessary for ordinary IVF. At least one plaintiff has made
a preconception tort claim based upon negligent IVF. See Doolan v. IVF America
(MA) Inc., No. 99-3476, 2000 LEXIS 581, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000). In Doolan,
however, the court held that the plaintiff's claim was for wrongful life and therefore
did not constitute a true preconception tort claim. Id. at *9-*12. See infra Part I.C. for
a discussion of the difference between preconception tort claims and wrongful life
claims.
11. A recent report that a team of scientists intends to clone a human being within
the next two years heightens concerns about potential harms through assisted
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Many courts have weighed policy considerations in deciding
whether to allow preconception tort causes of action.12 This Note,
however, suggests that in determining whether to allow preconception
tort claims, courts should base their decisions on traditional
negligence doctrine rather than policy. Furthermore, this Note argues
that courts should not look for a "relationship" between plaintiff and
defendant giving rise to a duty of care because this is an inappropriate
test for duty in the preconception tort context. Rather, in evaluating a
preconception duty of care, courts should determine whether there
was a nexus between the alleged injurious activity and the conception
and birth of a future child.
Part I of this Note provides an outline of state and federal case law
on prenatal and preconception torts. A review of the early rejection
and subsequent recognition of prenatal tort claims is necessary to
understand the evolution of preconception negligenceY This part
continues by dividing preconception torts into four categories of cases:
medical malpractice, pharmaceutical products, auto accidents, and
toxic substance exposure. 4 Because a variety of preconception claims
arise in the medical malpractice context, that section is further divided
into three subcategories: negligent surgery cases, in which a
negligently performed Caesarean section or abortion leads to
developmental abnormalities in a subsequent pregnancy;15 Rh factor
incompatibility cases, in which a doctor negligently fails to administer
Rho-GAM to a mother whose Rh factor is incompatible with that of
reproduction. See Sarah Delaney, Scientists Prepare to Clone a Human: Erperiment to
Target Infertile Couples, Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 2001, at A16; Jeremy Manier, Potential
Perils Born in Cloning: Risks Great Even in Anitmals, Researchers Say, Chi. Trib.,
Mar. 4, 2001, at 1 (noting that the majority of cloned animals die before birth and
those born alive "often suffer from ultimately fatal defects of the heart, lungs,
kidneys, brain or immune system"). Because human cloning has not yet been
attempted, this Note will set aside analysis of human cloning for another day.
12. See, e.g., Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. 1981)
(expressing concern that recognizing a preconception tort cause of action would
create an unmanageable number of claims and would discourage doctors from
treating female patients aggressively where harm to future children was implicated);
Taylor v. Cutler, 703 A.2d 294, 300 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (describing the
deterrent effect of preconception tort liability in the automobile accident context as
"speculative at best").
13. See Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability
for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongfid Life,
1978 Duke LJ. 1401, 1404-05 (noting that reviewing the history of prenatal tort causes
of action is a prerequisite to evaluating preconception tort and wrongful life claims).
14. Professor Greenberg has undertaken a helpful analysis of preconception torts
in an article which provides an extensive survey of cases by jurisdiction. See Julie A.
Greenberg, Reconceptualizing Preconception Torts, 64 Tenn. L Rev. 315, 320-35
(1997). Greenberg provides a brief synopsis of cases by category, dividing the existing
case law into three sections: medical malpractice, products liability, and other cases.
Id at 335-341. This Note focuses on an analysis by category and adds automobile
accidents and toxic substance exposure to the medical malpractice and products
liability categories. See infra Part I.B.
15. See infra Part I.B.l.a.
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her fetus, creating a condition (sensitization) that can harm later-
conceived children; 16 and rubella cases, in which a doctor negligently
fails to immunize a woman for rubella and she subsequently conceives
a child suffering defects attributable to congenital rubella syndrome. 7
Part II of this Note discusses two reasons why courts must develop a
more principled approach to preconception negligence. First, there is
currently disarray among and within jurisdictions in handling such
cases, resulting in discordant holdings that prevent a coherent
approach to preconception tort law. Second, the emergence of
advanced medical technologies threatens to increase the incidence of
preconception tort claims. Because the recognition of a
preconception tort claim will often hinge on the question of whether
there is a duty to an unconceived person, Part III of this Note analyzes
the duty element of negligence law in the context of preconception
torts. While some have suggested that the duty of care in negligence
cases is the sum total of policy considerations, 8 the first subsection of
Part III proposes a doctrinal approach that employs a nexus test for
establishing the duty of care. The second subsection applies the nexus
test for duty to the various types of preconception tort cases that have
been presented to the courts to date, as well as to emerging assisted
reproductive technologies.
I. PRENATAL AND PRECONCEPTION TORT JURISPRUDENCE
Preconception tort claims have spawned a rich line of case law
exploring the outer boundaries of the duty and proximate cause
elements of the tort of negligence. This part begins with a brief
examination of prenatal torts cases, which foreshadow the conceptual
challenges presented by the subsequent preconception claims. The
majority of this part is then devoted to a close analysis of state and
federal preconception tort cases. The preconception negligence cases
reveal that courts sometimes find a duty of care and other times balk
at the concept of a duty to future persons. Those courts that find a
duty often proceed to struggle with the issue of proximate cause.
Some jurisdictions resort to policy judgments in ruling on the
permissibility of preconception negligence claims, while others hold
that the policy considerations attendant upon the finding of a
preconception tort cause of action are so momentous that such a
decision is properly left to the legislature.
16. See infra Part I.B.l.b.
17. See infra Part I.B.l.c.
18. See, e.g., Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev.
1401, 1407 (1961).
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A. The Recognition of Prenatal Tort Causes of Action
Before commencing an analysis of preconception torts, it is helpful
to discuss the genesis of the parent category: prenatal torts."9 For
more than sixty years, the leading authority on the issue of prenatal
torts was the 1884 Massachusetts case of Dietrich v. Northampton,2'
which rejected the plaintiff's cause of action. In Dietrich, a woman
who was four or five months pregnant suffered a miscarriage when she
fell on a negligently-maintained road.2' The plaintiff, as administrator,
sued on behalf of the miscarried child, who died ten or fifteen minutes
after birth. ' Judge Holmes, denying the cause of action, announced
that there could be no duty of care to an unborn child."
An Irish court reached a similar conclusion in Walker v. Great
Northern Railway Co. of Ireland, 2 4 an 1891 case involving a pregnant
woman injured in a railroad accident.' In an influential concurring
opinion, Justice O'Brien of the Walker court explained his objection
to a prenatal tort cause of action:
[T]here are instances in the law where rules of right are founded
upon the inherent and inevitable difficulty or impossibility of proof.
And it is easy to see on what a boundless sea of speculation in
evidence this new idea would launch us. What a field would be
opened to extravagance of testimony, already great enough-if
Science could carry her lamp, not over certain in its light where
people have their eyes, into the unseen laboratory of nature .... 6
The Dietrich decision was bolstered further by the Supreme Court
of Illinois in the 1900 case of Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.' In
Allaire, a pregnant woman was injured in a hospital elevator accident,
causing her son, the plaintiff, to be born "greatly and sadly crippled
for life." 8  The majority framed the issue as follows: "Had the
plaintiff... such distinct and independent existence that he may
maintain the action, or was he, in view of the common law, a part of
his mother? '29  Citing Dietrich and Walker, the majority chose the
19. See Collins, supra note 6, at 678-82. Preconception torts can be considered a
subset of prenatal torts because tortious conduct prior to conception necessarily
involves tortious conduct prior to birth. See id. at 677-78 n.2. Preconception torts,
however, differ from ordinary prenatal torts in one significant respect. The plaintiff in
a preconception tort case does not physically exist at the time of the tortious act,
whereas the plaintiff in an ordinary prenatal tort case has at least been conceived at
the time of the defendant's wrongful conduct. Id.
20. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
21. Id. at 14.
22. Id. at 15.
23. Id at 15-16.
24. 28 I.L.R. 69 (Q.B. 1891).
25. Id. at 69-70.
26. Id. at 81 (O'Brien, J., concurring).
27. 56 N.E. 638 (II1. 1900).




latter alternative." In a sharp dissent, however, Justice Boggs posed
his own pointed question: "[I]s it not sacrificing truth to a mere
theoretical abstraction to say the injury was not to the child, but
wholly to the mother?"'"
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a 1933 decision, presaged the
reversal of the Dietrich rule by allowing a cause of action to a child
injured in utero when her mother was thrown from a tram car.3 The
compelling language of the Montreal Tramways v. Leveille majority
opinion, which strikes a chord similar to Justice Boggs' dissent in
Allaire, is worth quoting at length:
If a child after birth has no right of action for pre-natal injuries, we
have a wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy, for.., there is a
residuum of injury for which compensation cannot be had save at
the suit of the child. If a right of action be denied to the child it will
be compelled, without any fault on its part, to go through life
carrying the seal of another's fault and bearing a very heavy burden
of infirmity and inconvenience without any compensation therefor.
To my mind it is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and
viable, should be allowed to maintain an action in the Courts for
injuries wrongfully committed upon its person while in the womb of
its mother.33
Courts in the United States, however, continued follow Dietrich
until 1946, when, in a case that Dean Prosser characterized as the
catalyst for a "spectacular reversal of the no-duty rule[,]"34 the D.C.
Circuit held that a child born alive may maintain an action for
prenatal injuries.35 Justifying its departure from Dietrich, the court in
Bonbrest v. Kotz wrote: "The law is presumed to keep pace with the
sciences and medical science certainly has made progress since
1884." 3  By 1971, the Bonbrest rule, allowing recovery for prenatal
injuries to children born alive, was accepted in every American
jurisdiction.37 Although some early decisions indicated that viability
was the earliest point at which a fetus could allege a cognizable injury,
the difficulty of establishing the point of viability led the majority of
30. The majority also noted the following consideration: "If the action can be
maintained, it necessarily follows that an infant may maintain an action against its
own mother for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the mother while pregnant
with it. We are of the opinion that the action will not lie." Id. at 640.
31. Id. at 641.
32. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337.
33. Id. at 345.
34. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 55, at 368
(5th ed. 1984).
35. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
36. Id. at 143.
37. See Keeton et al., supra note 34, § 55, at 368 & n.15 (citing 40 A.L.R.3d 1222
(1971), the Second Restatement of Torts, § 869, and various cases across jurisdictions
for the proposition that a child born alive can recover for prenatal injuries arising
from another's tort).
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jurisdictions to allow recovery for injuries inflicted at any time after
conception.8
The new rule, however, was not without its detractors. Particularly
noteworthy was Chief Judge Duckworth of the Georgia Supreme
Court, who wrote a concurring opinion in Hornbuckle v. Plantation
Pipe Line Company.39 The Hornbuckle majority extended Georgia
common law to allow infants to recover for tortious injuries suffered
at any time after conception.' Chief Judge Duckworth protested the
scope of the court's holding:
The ruling of the majority in this case extends [Georgia law] to allow
the child to maintain a suit for damages to the cell from which it
came, even though the cell had been conceived ten seconds.... If a
baby can sue for injuries sustained five seconds after conception ...
why not allow such suits for injuries before conception, even unto
the third and fourth generations?41
Writing in 1956, Duckworth was more likely aspiring to achieve
hyperbole than attempting to put his finger on a controversy that
would gain increasing significance with advances in biomedical
knowledge. Nevertheless, his question about liability for harms at the
cellular level prior to conception is increasingly relevant in the present
era of advanced assisted reproductive technologies that implicate
preconception harms.
B. Preconception Tort Cases
Although preconception tort claims did not arise in significant
numbers until the 1970s, there were a handful of precursors from the
1880s to the 1960s. An analysis of preconception torts should begin at
the point when the cause of action was just a gleam in Judge Holmes'
eye in Dietrich, the former leading case on prenatal torts. -  In
Dietrich, Holmes rejected the idea of a cause of action for a child who
suffered a prenatal injury.43 In dicta, however, Holmes speculated
about the difficulties that would arise "if we should assume,
irrespective of precedent, that a man might owe a civil duty and incur
a conditional prospective liability in tort to one not yet in being."'
This problem of recognizing a duty to nonexistent persons remains the
central difficulty in preconception tort liability.
38. Id § 55, at 368-69.
39. 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956).
40. 1& at 728.
41. Id. at 729 (Duckworth, C.J., concurring).
42- See Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); supra text accompanying
notes 20-23.
43. Id. at 15. ("[N]o case, so far as we know, has ever decided that, if the infant
survived, it could maintain an action for injuries received by it while in its mother's
womb.").
44 Id. at 16.
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Three years after Dietrich, the New York Court of Appeals, in
Piper v. Hoard, decided a preconception tort claim in favor of the
plaintiff.45 In Piper, Andrew Piper devised his property to his two
sons, James and Frederick, on the condition that if Frederick died
without children his share of the land would go to James. 6 Before he
had any children, however, Frederick conveyed his land to the
defendant, John Hoard.47 In order to prevent the land from reverting
to James upon Frederick's death, Hoard approached Catherine Hagel
and encouraged her to marry Frederick Piper and bear his children. 8
Hoard falsely represented to Catherine that if she had children with
Frederick, the children would stand to inherit land, 9 when in reality
the birth of such children would ensure that Hoard would hoard the
land, so to speak. Catherine married Frederick and bore a daughter,
who later became the plaintiff in the action against Hoard. 0 The
plaintiff claimed that she should be awarded the land because the
defendant had acquired it through illicit means: namely, fraud against
the plaintiff's mother." The court acknowledged that the alleged
fraud was perpetrated before the plaintiff was conceived. 2
Nevertheless, the court found privity between the plaintiff and
defendant because the plaintiff was the product of the marriage
brought about by Hoard's fraud and she would have owned the land if
the defendant's representations had been true. 3 The court glossed
over the anomaly that if the defendant had not perpetrated the fraud
against the plaintiff's mother, the plaintiff would not have existed.
Piper was a property case, and property law has a tradition of
recognizing the rights of future persons?4 The plaintiff in Zepeda v.
Zepeda," who made a claim of preconception fraudulent
misrepresentation in the family context, benefited from no such
tradition. In Zepeda, the defendant promised to marry the plaintiff's
mother, who had sexual intercourse with the defendant in reliance on
his word.56 The defendant could not fulfill his promise because he was
already married. 7 The plaintiff, conceived during the affair, sued his
biological father for injury to "his person, property and reputation by
45. Piper v. Hoard, 13 N.E. 626, 632 (N.Y. 1887).






52. Id. at 631.
53. Id.
54. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 869 cmt. a (1977) (describing how
property law and criminal law recognized the legal status of unborn children before
there was a prenatal tort cause of action).
55. 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).
56. Id. at 851.
57. Id.
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causing him to be born an adulterine bastard."58 The court held that
the plaintiff, who claimed mental suffering and defamation, had not
suffered a legally cognizable injury.59 While the court admitted "it
would be pure fiction to say that the plaintiff suffer[ed] no injury," it
was reluctant to create a cause of action for bad parenting or wrongful
life.60 In principle, however, the Zepeda court reasoned that it was
possible for liability to attach to a preconception tort.61 The court
began its analysis with a hypothetical, a practice emulated in many
subsequent preconception tort cases. The court reasoned that a child
injured by a faulty space heater purchased prior to his birth would not
be denied a cause of action simply because he did not exist at the time
of manufacture or purchase.62 The Zepeda court stated: "It makes no
difference how much time elapses between a wrongful act and a
resulting injury if there is a causal relation between them."63 Going
even further, the court suggested that a plaintiff might be able to
recover for non-physical injuries arising out of preconception torts.64
By the time of the Zepeda case, courts had come a long way in both
recognizing prenatal tort causes of action and acknowledging the
possibility of preconception tort claims. Soon after Zepeda,
preconception negligence claims would sprout up in a variety of
settings. The next sections undertake an analysis of preconception
negligence claims in four different contexts: medical malpractice,
pharmaceutical products, auto accidents, and toxic substance
exposure.
1. Preconception Torts in the Medical Context
Preconception negligence claims have arisen most frequently in the
area of medical malpractice. This is primarily because the care
provided by obstetricians/gynecologists, if negligent, has the potential
to injure a subsequently conceived child. As the cases below
illustrate, however, a doctor-patient relationship between a physician
and a potential mother does not automatically create a duty of care
flowing from the doctor to the patient's future children. The
availability of a preconception medical malpractice cause of action
depends on the jurisdiction and the context within which the medical
care was provided.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 855-56.
60. Id. at 856, 858. See infra Part I.C. for a definition and discussion of the
wrongful life cause of action.
61. Id. at 853.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 854 (citing Piper v. Hoard, 13 N.E. 626 (N.Y. 1887)).
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a. Negligent Surgery Cases
A doctor's negligence in performing surgery on the reproductive
organs of a potential mother raises the possibility that a future child
will be harmed. The cases in this section explore whether a surgeon
has a duty not only to avoid harm to her patient, but also to prevent
injury to her patient's future children.
An early case in which a surgical procedure led to a preconception
tort claim on behalf of the child is Bergstreser v. Mitchell.65 In
Bergstreser, the plaintiff's mother alleged that her doctor negligently
performed a Caesarean section while delivering one child, leading to a
uterine rupture during her pregnancy with her next child." The latter
child, delivered by emergency Caesarean section, suffered brain
damage from lack of oxygen.67 The circuit court, applying Missouri
law, found it compelling that the Missouri Supreme Court had, like
many other courts, expanded tort law to compensate prenatal injuries
to children born alive.' The opinion states:
[T]he Missouri Supreme Court has... refused to be bound by
outmoded common law and has declined to allow an injury to be
suffered without a remedy .... We think that the Missouri Supreme
Court would permit an infant, born alive, to bring an action for
injuries resulting from negligent acts occurring prior to conception. 69
The Eighth Circuit thus permitted a preconception tort claim arising
out of negligent surgery.
The New York Court of Appeals took a different view in Albala v.
City of New York,70 rejecting preconception tort liability. In Albala, a
woman underwent an abortion during which her uterus was
accidentally perforated.7' Four and a half years later, she gave birth to
a son suffering brain damage.72 The parents sued the hospital on
behalf of the child, alleging that the damage to the mother's uterus
during the prior abortion caused the son's brain damage.73 While the
court acknowledged that a negligent abortion could foreseeably harm
a later-conceived child, it refused to find a duty of care based
exclusively on foreseeability of harm.74 The majority was concerned
65. 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978).
66. Id. at 24.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 25 & n.3 (citing Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Mo. 1976);
Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953)).
69. Id. at 25-26.
70. 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981). For an analysis of the Albala decision, see
Stephanie Webster Harris, Recent Developments: Torts-Preconception-Infant's Right
to a Cause of Action, 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 195 (1982).
71. Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 787.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 788.
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that recognizing a cause of action would, first, "require the extension
of traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds,"75 and
second, "have the undesirable impact of encouraging the practice of
'defensive medicine."' 76 On the latter issue, the court reasoned that a
doctor might stop short of rendering all necessary medical care to a
female patient if such care raised the specter of legally actionable
harm to a future child.'
More than a decade after Albala, the United States District Court
in Massachusetts rejected tort claims by two children arising out of
negligent surgery on their mother before they were conceived.'M In
Lareau v. Page, the prospective mother underwent cranial surgery,
and doctors injected a contrast dye, Thorotrast, into her skull for
monitoring purposes. 9 A few years later, she married and started a
family." Fourteen years after the surgery, the plaintiffs' mother began
experiencing headaches and seizures, and doctors discovered a
hardened mass in her skull attributable to the Thorotrast~l After
being advised by her doctor of a slight tumor risk and viewing a news
program about Thorotrast's dangers, the mother in Lareau alleged
severe emotional distress.' Her two children, a daughter and son,
claimed loss of consortium and emotional injuries.' -
The Lareau court dismissed the daughter's claim because she was
conceived after her mother knew about the harm from the contrast
dye, and the court did not want to create a situation where parents
could create perpetual loss of consortium claims by conceiving more
children after suffering an injury.' Because the son was born after the
surgery, but before his mother knew of her injury, his claim merited
further analysis.'0 Most significantly, the court determined that his
claim for emotional injuries failed on grounds of proximate cause
rather than duty. 6  The court reasoned that, "it is simply not
reasonably foreseeable that, nineteen years after the injection,
Christopher's mother would be subject to a hyped-up television
report.., and would thereby be rendered such an 'emotional wreck'
75. Id. at 787.
76. Id. at 788.
77. Id. A dissenting judge in Albala lamented that although the facts of the case
"meet the essential negligence law prescriptions of foreseeability and causation ...
the right to recover is now denied because of the novelty of this groundbreaking suit,
the possibility that it will lead to an unknown number of similar claims and on other
policy grounds." Id at 789.
78. Lareau v. Page, 840 F. Supp. 920, 922-23 (D. Mass. 1993).
79. Id at 923.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 923-24.
82. Id. at 923.
83. Id. at 929-30.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 930-33.
86. Id. at 931.
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as would cause separation anxiety on the part of her then seven year
old son."87
In an even more recent case, Martin v. St. John Hospital and
Medical Center,88 a Michigan court of appeals recognized a wrongful
death cause of action for a child who died as the result of a negligent
Caesarean section performed on her mother during a previous
pregnancy. The deceased child's mother in Martin delivered a healthy
child by Caesarean section and became pregnant again the following
year. 9 During the second delivery, she suffered a ruptured uterus at
the location of the Caesarean incision, causing the second child to be
stillborn.9" The court framed the issue as "whether the parents of a
fetus, viable before death, can maintain a wrongful death action based
on surgical procedures performed on the mother's reproductive
organs before conception."91 In finding a legally cognizable cause of
action, the court focused on two factors: (1) the timing of the injury to
the fetus, and (2) the relationship between the negligent procedure
and the fetal injury.92 The timing of the injury was crucial because
Michigan law did not permit a cause of action for a pre-viability injury
to a stillborn child.93 The court held that the timing of the negligent
act was irrelevant, analogizing the negligent repair of the mother's
uterus and death of the subsequently conceived child to the negligent
repair of a furnace in summertime leading to the death of a child by
inhalation of fumes in the winter.94 The court declared: "We would
conclude that the injury occurred when the fumes were released, not
when the furnace was repaired."'  More significantly, the court
looked at relevant Michigan cases and indicated that a logical
connection between the type of care provided by the doctor and the
subsequent pregnancy was an important factor in establishing a duty
of care flowing from the doctor to the later-conceived child.96 On a
policy level, the Martin court, unlike the Albala court, was more
concerned with fairness than with the possibility of opening the
floodgates of litigation.97
87. Id.
88. 517 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
89. Id. at 788.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 789-90.
93. Id. at 789.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 788-90. The Martin court noted that failure to administer a rubella test
to a woman who plans to become pregnant implicates a duty to a later-conceived
child because the purpose of the rubella test is, in large part, to prevent rubella
syndrome in developing fetuses. See id. at 789 (discussing Monusko v. Postle, 437
N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)). For a discussion of Monusko, see infra text
accompanying notes 155-60.
97. See id. at 790.
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In the preconception surgery cases, a doctor's affirmative act of
negligence, or misfeasance, 98 results in harm to a future child. Most
preconception medical malpractice claims, however, arise out of a
physician's failure to act, or nonfeasance." The next two sections deal
primarily with nonfeasance, where a doctor's failure to immunize a
prospective mother results in harm to a later-conceived child.
b. Rh Factor Sensitization Cases
There is a line of preconception tort cases addressing medical
negligence by physicians who create or, more commonly, fail to
counteract a blood incompatibility detrimental to a subsequently
conceived child. Almost all of the jurisdictions that have reviewed
such cases have permitted a cause of action. A close examination of
the cases, however, reveals that uniformity in outcome is not
tantamount to uniformity of approach.
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital' is a key case establishing a
preconception tort cause of action against doctors who negligently
cause an Rh factor compatibility problem between a mother and her
later-conceived child. The plaintiffs mother in Renslow had Rh-
negative blood, but a doctor mistakenly transfused her with Rh-
positive blood at age thirteen.10' Due to the doctor's mistake, her
blood became "sensitized," a condition in which the prospective
mother's blood would attack an Rh-positive fetus.1'2 When the
woman became pregnant eight years later, her Rh-positive child (the
plaintiff) suffered irreversible brain, nervous system, and organ
damage. 3 The Renslow court framed the issue as one of duty:
"Plaintiff herein asks us to reexamine our notions of duty, and to find,
in essence, a contingent prospective duty to a child not yet conceived
but foreseeably harmed by a breach of duty to the child's mother.""
The majority noted that traditional negligence doctrine requires the
breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, an element not satisfied by the
showing of a breach of duty to another person."' The court, however,
found that the intimate relationship between mother and child
justified the finding of a duty flowing from doctor to child under the
98. See Black's Law Dictionary 1015 (7th ed. 1999) (defining misfeasance as -[a]
lawful act performed in a wrongful manner").
99. See id. at 1076 (defining nonfeasance as "[t]he failure to act when a duty to act
existed").
100. 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977). For an analysis of Renslow, see Dawn R. Duven,
Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 Neb. L Rev. 706, 708-
09, 717-20 (1977).
101. Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
102. Id.
103. Id.




theory of "transferred negligence."' 6 The Renslow court explicitly
declined to base its decision on proximate cause because of the
arbitrary line drawing inherent in setting the outer boundary of legal
causation. 7 Rather, the court "reaffirm[ed] the utility of the concept
of duty as a means by which to direct and control the course of the
common law."' 8 The court declared that a child has "a right to be
born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of
duty to the child's mother."' 9
The Indiana Supreme Court, fifteen years after Renslow,
recognized a preconception tort cause of action for injuries stemming
from Rh factor sensitization.' The doctor in Walker v. Rinck failed
to administer Rho-GAM to counteract the formation of harmful
antibodies during the plaintiffs' mother's first pregnancy., Over the
next nine years, the mother gave birth to three children (the plaintiffs)
who suffered health complications attributed to their mother's Rh
factor sensitization" 2  In recognizing a cause of action for
preconception tort, the Walker court evaluated three factors relevant
to the existence of a duty of care: "(1) the relationship between the
parties, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person
injured, and (3) public policy concerns." '113 The court had no difficulty
concluding that the foreseeability and public policy prongs were
satisfied."' More significantly, however, the court had little trouble
establishing a relationship between the doctor and the future children
injured through his negligence."' The court reasoned: "The giving of
Rho[-]GAM was to protect future fetuses of Mrs. Walker from
developing injuries in utero. We believe that under those
circumstances, Dr. Rinck owed a duty to the Walker children ...." ,,16
The court found it important that the plaintiffs were foreseeable third-
party beneficiaries of the relationship between the defendant doctor
106. Id. at 1255 (citing William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1,
20-22 (1953)).
107. Id. at 1254.
108. Id. The court added that it would be "illogical to bar relief for an act done
prior to conception where the defendant would be liable for th[e] same conduct had
the child, unbeknownst to him, been conceived prior to his act." Id. at 1255.
109. Id. A dissenting judge in Renslow criticized the majority for employing a false
duty analysis and abandoning "the fault theory of tort law in favor of a system based
merely upon causation." Id. at 1263 (Ryan, J., dissenting). According to the dissent,
"[a] holding which finds a duty of care owed to an entity which is not in existence
must be considered the classic illustration of 'negligence in the air."' Id. at 1264.
110. See Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591,592 (Ind. 1992).
111. Id. at 592; see Karen J. Carlson et al., The Harvard Guide to Women's Health
533 (1996). Rho-GAM usually prevents sensitization where the mother has not yet
developed antibodies to the fetus' Rh factor. See Carlson et al., supra, at 533.
112. Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 592-93.
113. Id. at 594.
114. Id. at 595.
115. See id. at 594-95.
116. Id. at 595.
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and their mother.1 17 At the same time, the court found the connection
between the medical care provided and the harm to the subsequently
conceived children significant to the finding of a duty.'" Responding
to the defendant's argument that creating a preconception tort cause
of action is a matter for the legislature, the court declared: "it is the
traditional role of the highest court of a state to determine the
common law of that state even if such determination results in an
innovative growth of the common law." 1 9
In another Rh factor case, Graham v. Keuchel,12' the court
permitted a preconception tort cause of action, employing an analysis
echoing Walker. The Graham court found a duty of care flowing
directly to the child instead of being transferred through the mother .12
The court concluded that a doctor has a duty not only to treat a
prospective mother with due care, but also to guard against harms to
foreseeable offspring conceived in the future. -' In Graham, the
doctors failed to detect an Rh factor incompatibility in a prior
pregnancy. 123  As a result, they failed to immunize the plaintiffs
mother with Rho-GAM, leading to the harm suffered by the
subsequently conceived plaintiff.24 Significantly, the court noted that
the injured child, though not conceived at the time of the mother's
treatment, "was within the zone of danger that Rho-GAM was
designed to guard against."' 2 Unlike Renslow, the Graham court was
not troubled by the issue of proximate cause, stating that "the direct
causal connection between failure to prevent sensitization and the
subsequent birth of the child with fatal condition is crystal clear."'2 -6
Rather, the Graham court focused on whether the mother's
conception of a child after her blood had become sensitized
represented a supervening cause of the child's injury (in this case,
death). The court held that a mother's ordinary negligence in
conceiving the child would not relieve the doctors of liability."-
Willfulness or recklessness in conceiving a child with the knowledge of
sensitization and the risks entailed, however, would form a
117. Id
118. See id.
119. Id. at 594. Chief Justice Shepard dissented on grounds that a preconception
tort cause of action would expose doctors "to decades or even generations of
potential liability" and would occasion "ugly lawsuits" in which parents could "create
liabiity ... by choosing to conceive." Id. at 597-98 (Shepard, CJ., dissenting).
120. 847 P.2d 342 (Okla. 1993).
121. See id. at 365.
122- Id
123. Id. at 365-66.
124. Id. at 366. The court noted that Rho-GAM is administered seventy-two hours
prior to delivery in cases where the mother's Rh factor differs from that of the child.
Id. at 346-47 & rm.7, 14, & 19; see also Carlson et al., supra note 111, at 533.
125. Graham, 847 P.2d at 365.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 348.
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supervening cause cutting off liability.' The court concluded that
supervening causation was an issue of fact to be determined by a
properly instructed jury.129
On the heels of Graham, the Missouri Supreme Court faced the
issue of preconception negligence in a case where, due to a lab
technician's error, doctors failed to immunize a woman's blood during
an Rh factor incompatible pregnancy. 30 The child in the subsequent
pregnancy suffered from erythroblastosis fetalis (EBF), a condition in
which the fetus' system is "constantly under attack. '1 3' The baby
"sustained devastating pulmonary, cardiovascular and neurological
damage.' ' 32 The Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic court focused on the
duty element of negligence.133 The court cited the Renslow nexus
requirement for imposition of a duty approvingly, stating that "the
very reason for the RhoGAM treatment is to benefit later-conceived
children of the mother."'" The majority then criticized Albala for
creating a "'blanket no-duty rule.""' 35 It also questioned the Albala
court's fears about opening the floodgates of litigation and creating
conditions in which doctors practice defensive medicine. 36 The court
noted that since the child is the only party who physically benefits
from the administration of Rho-GAM, there is no treatment
benefiting the mother that a doctor would forego for fear of liability
to a future child. 37
Like other courts that have held in favor of causes of action for
preconception torts, the Lough court stated that "[i]t is unjust and
arbitrary to deny recovery.., simply because [the child] had not been
conceived at the time of [the defendant's] negligence."13s1 The
majority offered the following hypothetical to illustrate its point:
Assume a balcony is negligently constructed. Two years later, a
mother and her one-year-old child step onto the balcony and it gives
way, causing serious injuries to both the mother and child. It would
be ludicrous to suggest that only the mother would have a cause of
action against the builder but, because the infant was not conceived
at the time of the negligent conduct, no duty of care existed toward
the child.13 9
128. Id.
129. Id. at 353-54.
130. See Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, 866 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
131. Id. at 852.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 854 ("The basic question in this case is whether a duty exists.").
134. Id. at 853 (citing Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1977)).
135. Id. (quoting Keeton et al., supra note 34, § 55, at 369).
136. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77 for a discussion of the Albala
court's policy concerns.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 854.
139. Id.
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The court's hypothetical highlights that there are classes of negligence
cases in which no one would question the existence of a duty to future
persons. The hypothetical also illustrates that the duty element is
about enforcing the obligation to avoid foreseeable injuries and thus
serves a fairness function in negligence law.
In Sweeney v. Preston,1" the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed
a county circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant
in an Rh sensitization case involving the death of two infants. The
mother in Sweeney conceived one of the deceased children before she
knew her blood was sensitized and one after her doctor informed her
about her condition. 4' The Sweeney majority did not tackle the issue
of preconception tort liability.4 2 In a noteworthy dissent, however,
the chief justice stated that he would bar the action not only on statute
of limitations grounds, but also because the parents' independent act
of conceiving a child after knowing the mother's blood was sensitized
served as an "intervening cause" cutting off the doctor's liability. 4 '
The dissent analogized the case to one in which a lawyer warns a
client of a defective title and the client proceeds to buy the property
anyway.'" The dissent also pointed to fairness and policy reasons for
denying a cause of action:
The majority not only holds Dr. Preston responsible for these two
tragic deaths, but tells the Sweeneys they will have a cause of action
for every child the Sweeneys attempt in the future who dies shortly
after birth, or who is born maimed and deformed.
Instead of worrying about his patients when he lies down to sleep
at night, Dr. Preston can look forward to the very good chance of
being a court defendant the remainder of his life. With this burden
it will take a very soft pillow to give him much sleep. It would be far
better if physicians in small towns could spend their time worrying
about their patients [rather] than lawsuits such as the majority today
authorizes. 14
5
While the dissent's fairness and policy arguments are gripping, they
are superfluous in the face of the supervening cause analysis, which
yields the same result.
140. 642 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1994). The circuit court in Sweeney had granted
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff was barred by a two-year statute
of limitations for medical negligence actions. Id. at 332-33. The Mississippi Supreme
Court held that the statute did not bar the claim because it "does not begin to run
until the injured party discovers or should have discovered the negligent act and its
relationship to the injury sustained." Id. at 333.
141. Id.
142. See id
143. Id. at 342 (Hawkins, CJ., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id at 341.
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Early last year, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in favor of
preconception tort liability in an Rh factor sensitization case.146 In
Lynch v. Scheininger, the trial court had ruled that the parents'
conception of the child plaintiff with knowledge that the mother's
blood was sensitized formed a supervening cause cutting off the
doctor's liability. 4 7 The intermediate appellate court disagreed with
the supervening cause analysis and reversed.148 The New Jersey
Supreme Court ultimately held that the parents' decision to conceive
was not a superseding cause as a matter of law, but rather was an issue
for the jury.'49 In addition, the court stated that the jury might need to
be instructed on the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which
"proceeds on the theory that a plaintiff who has suffered an injury as
the proximate result of a tort cannot recover for any portion of the
harm that by the exercise of ordinary care he could have avoided." 150
The Lynch court rejected the idea that a doctor is under no duty to
guard against injuries to children who are not conceived at the time
that medical care is provided. 5' The court explained that
"foreseeability as a determinant of duty is of sufficient breadth to
accommodate the principle that in appropriate circumstances a
physician's duty should extend to children conceived after the
physician's negligence occurred."'' 5 In response to the argument that
recognition of a preconception tort cause of action will cause
unlimited liability, the court expressed confidence that proximate
cause doctrine would limit claims that were too remote. 53
c. Rubella Cases
It is commonly known within the medical community that if a
woman contracts rubella (German measles) during the early stages of
a pregnancy, her child is at a high risk for severe birth defects.1- 4 In
two preconception medical malpractice cases, the plaintiffs alleged
harms from the negligent failure to immunize their respective mothers
146. See Lynch v. Scheininger, 744 A.2d 113 (N.J. 2000).
147. Id. at 119.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 128.
150. Id. at 125. (citing Keeton et al., supra note 34, § 65, at 458-59).
151. Id. at 126.
152. Id. at 126-27.
153. Id. at 127. Several state high courts have been presented with preconception
Rh sensitization cases but have failed to undertake a probing preconception tort
analysis. The Connecticut and Maine Supreme Courts rejected preconception Rh
sensitization claims because the applicable statute of limitations had expired. See
McDonald v. Haynes Med. Lab., Inc., 471 A.2d 646, 649-50 (Conn. 1984); Kennedy v.
McLean, 555 A.2d 1057, 1058 (Mass. 1989). The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld
a physican's liability for harms arising out of preconception Rh sensitization, but
analyzed the claim as "an ordinary prenatal injury tort." Empire Casualty Co. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Colo. 1988).
154. See Carlson et al., supra note 111, at 538.
[Vol. 692572
2001] PRECONCEPTION TORTS & THE NEXUS TEST 2573
against rubella. The cases yielded divergent results, based upon a
distinction in the doctor-patient relationship.
In Monusko v. Postle, 155 the Michigan Court of Appeals allowed a
child's preconception negligence claim against a doctor who failed to
immunize the child's mother against rubellaY' The plaintiffs mother
had received care for several years from the defendant physicians in
connection with conceiving and bearing children." When she went to
the medical clinic to have her intrauterine device (IUD) removed in
order to have another child, doctors failed to offer her testing orimmunization for rubella. 158 When she became pregnant the following
year, her child developed congenital rubella syndrome and suffered
physical and mental injuries associated with the condition.'59 Relying
on a duty analysis, and noting the rubella tests are "designed
specifically to alleviate the sort of injuries we have in this case," the
Monusko court held that the child had a cause of action based on
preconception negligence.' 6
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts reached a decision different
from the Monusko court in a subsequent preconception rubella
immunization case.161 In McNulty v. McDowell, the plaintiffs mother
saw the defendant physician twice for gynecology visits regarding use
of an IUD for contraception.1'62 The physician did not recommend
that the plaintiffs mother get a rubella shot. 63 About a year after her
second visit with the doctor, the mother gave birth to a baby girl (the
plaintiff) who suffered from "numerous congenital defects
attributable to congenital rubella syndrome, including deafness,
blindness, severe mental retardation and heart defects."'' As in other
preconception medical care cases, the court evaluated the connection
between the doctor's treatment and the subsequent pregnancy in
order to determine whether a duty existed.165 The court concluded
that "the sparse contacts between [the mother] and [the doctor] and
the fact that these contacts were made not in anticipation of
pregnancy, but rather to avoid it, are insufficient to establish.., a
duty."1" The court thus denied a preconception tort cause of action
155. 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
156. Id. at 369.
157. Id. at 368.
158. Id
159. Id.
160. Id. at 369-70.
161. See McNulty v. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904. 907-08 (Mass. 1993). For an in-
depth analysis of McNulty, see Mark L Monopoli, Comment, McNulty v. McDowell:
Recognizing Preconception Tort in the Commonwealth?, 29 New Eng. L Rev. 763
(1995).
162. McNulty, 613 N.E.2d at 905.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 906.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 907.
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because there was no logical connection between the type of care
provided and the birth of a future child. Although the outcomes of
preconception medical malpractice cases have been divergent, the
McNulty and Monusko decisions, taken together, suggest a
harmonizing principle: a nexus between the medical care provided
and the conception or birth a future child is enough to create a
preconception duty of care.
2. Pharmaceutical Products Cases
The state and federal courts have issued several opinions on
preconception tort liability for pharmaceutical companies. The first of
these, Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories,67 involves birth
control pills. All but one of the subsequent cases have arisen out of
the use of the drug DES."6  Cases involving harm from defective
pharmaceutical products are typically analyzed under the rubric of
strict products liability.169 In the preconception tort context, however,
courts curiously have looked beyond injury and actual causation and
turned to an assessment of duty and proximate cause.
In Jorgensen, the plaintiffs' mother took birth control pills from
May through November of 1966.170 In July of the following year, she
gave birth to twins suffering from Down's Syndrome, one of whom
died at age three. 7' The complaint alleged that the birth control pills
had "'altered the chromosome structure within the body of the
[mother] ... and as a result thereof, a Mongoloid deformity was
created' in the twin plaintiffs.172  The district court dismissed the
claim, stating that a preconception tort was not a cognizable claim in
Oklahoma and that creating such a cause of action was a matter for
the legislature.173 The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal, noting that
"the right to sue for prenatal injury has generally evolved from court
decisions. "174 On the substantive issue, the court used a hypothetical
167. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
168. See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991); Grover v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992).
169. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) (applying
strict products liability to a claim involving harm to the child of woman who ingested
DES while pregnant). Under a strict products liability theory of recovery, fault is of
diminished significance. See Keeton et al., supra note 34, § 98, at 692-93. The doctrine
arose out of the following considerations: first, manufacturers are in the best position
to avoid harms and spread losses; second, strict liability increases the incentive for
manufacturers to prevent accidents; and third, manufacturers should be liable for
harms caused by their products even where fault is hard to prove under traditional
negligence doctrine. Id.
170. Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 238.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 239 (quoting the complaint on behalf of plaintiff Pamela B. Jorgensen,
the surviving twin).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 241.
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to point out the fundamental problem inherent in a blanket rejection
of preconception tort claims: "If the view prevailed that tortious
conduct occurring prior to conception is not actionable in behalf of an
infant ultimately injured by the wrong, then an infant suffering
personal injury from a defective food product, manufactured before
his conception, would be without remedy.' ' 75
The New York Court of Appeals rejected preconception tort
liability in Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co._1 6 the first of several cases
alleging third generation harm from the drug DES. In Enright, the
plaintiff's grandmother took DES during her pregnancy with the
plaintiff's mother, who developed reproductive system deformities as
a result of her exposure to the drug."7  Because of her mother's
reproductive system abnormalities, the plaintiff was born prematurely,
afflicted with cerebral palsy and other complications ultimately
attributable to her mother's DES exposure . 7  The trial court
dismissed the case for failure to state a cognizable claim, but the
intermediate appellate court reinstated the case on the theory of strict
products liability.179  The Court of Appeals acknowledged that in
Albala it "left open the question whether a different result might
obtain under a strict products liability theory. ''""i In Enright, however,
the court found no basis for departing from Albala's no-duty rule in
preconception tort cases.' 8'
In reaching its decision, the Enright court focused on three issues.
First, it expressed concern that, owing to the controversial nature of
the drug, DES plaintiffs might be treated as a "favored class for whose
benefit all traditional limitations on tort liability must give way."'"
The court concluded that it was not going to permit a cause of action
simply because DES was involved."8 Second, akin to the defensive
medicine concern in Albala, the Court of Appeals worried about "the
dangers of overdeterrence-the possibility that research will be
discouraged or beneficial drugs withheld from the market... [if] we
are asked to recognize a legal duty toward generations not yet
conceived."1" The court was not worried about underdeterring drug
companies from inflicting injuries because "manufacturers remain
amenable to suit by all those injured by exposure to their product, a
175. Id. at 240.
176. 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991). For an in-depth analysis of Enright, see Margaret
M. Hershiser, Casenote, Preconception Tort Liability-The Duty to Third
Generations: Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 24 Creighton L. Rev. 1479 (1991).
177. Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 199.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 200.
180. Id. at 202.
181. Id. For a detailed discussion of Albala, see supra text accompanying notes 70-
77.
182. Id. at 201.
183. Id. at 202.
184. Id. at 204.
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class whose size is commensurate with the risk created."18 5 Third, the
court noted that the plaintiff failed to meet the requirements of a
statute governing DES litigation requiring actual contact with the
drug in order to make out a cause of action. 86
The Supreme Court of Ohio found the Enright decision persuasive
when it held against a third generation DES cause of action in Grover
v. Eli Lilly & Co.'87 The Grover court decided the issue on a certified
question from the federal district court in the Northern District of
Ohio."8 The district court put the question as follows:
Does Ohio recognize a cause of action on behalf of a child born
prematurely, and with severe birth defects, if it can be established
that such injuries were proximately caused by defects in the child's
mother's reproductive system, those defects in turn being
proximately caused by the child's grandmother ingesting a defective
drug (DES) during her pregnancy with the child's mother?"8 9
In Grover, the plaintiff's mother was born with an impaired cervix due
to in utero exposure to DES. 9 ° The plaintiff, as in Enright, was born
prematurely, suffering from cerebral palsy. 9' Although the opinion
gives some attention to the question of duty, the case was ultimately
decided on grounds of proximate cause. The court concluded:
"Because of the remoteness in time and causation, we hold that
Charles Grover does not have an independent cause of action."' 92
185. Id. at 203 (emphasis added). The class of persons exposed to DES would
include a pregnant woman who ingested DES and the child who was developing
inside her uterus at the time of ingestion. A grandchild suffering birth defects as a
result of his or her mother's reproductive abnormalities traceable to DES would not
have any actual exposure to the drug and thus would be outside the class. The dissent
in Enright focused on the majority's deterrence argument, criticizing it as an example
of both flawed reasoning and improper policy judgment. Id. at 207 (Hancock, J.
dissenting). The dissent said that even if deterrence were relevant, the court should
be no "less concerned with deterring the development of unsafe drugs which may
cause latent damage to the third generation than to the second." Id.
186. Id. at 202 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c). The Enright dissent argued that "two
fundamental principles of justice" weighed in favor of a cause of action for the
plaintiff. Id. at 209. First, the plaintiff, who suffered "a wrong of enormous
proportions which inflicted grievous injuries on her and countless other innocent
persons," should not be without a remedy. Id. Second, under the principle that "like
cases should be treated alike," a plaintiff who "is damaged no less than other victims
of DES who make up the class" should be allowed to recover. Id.
187. 591 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ohio 1992). For an in-depth treatment of Grover, see
Todd Paul Myers, Casenote, Ohio Rejects Preconception Cause of Action for DES
Grandchildren, 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 283 (1993).
188. Grover, 591 N.E.2d at 697.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 702.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 700. The Grover dissent, however, pointed out that the majority was
inconsistent when "in one breath it correctly states that 'we are required to assume
that Charles Grover['s] ... injuries were proximately caused by his mother's exposure
to DES,' but then ultimately concludes that '[b]ecause of remoteness in time and
causation ... [he] does not have an independent cause of action."' Id. at 702 n.4
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In the most recent third generation DES case, an Illinois appellate
court denied a cause of action without reaching the substance of the
claim.193 In Sparapany v. Rexall Corp., the plaintiffs' grandmother
ingested DES in the 1950s, exposing their mother to the drug in
utero. 19  Their mother "developed an incompetent cervix and a
malformed uterus."'95 As a result, one of the plaintiffs was stillborn
and the other suffered serious birth defects. 96 The only issue on
appeal was whether the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Renslow,
allowing preconception tort claims, was prospective only and thus
barred the plaintiffs' cause of action. 97
The Sparapany court held that the plaintiffs' claims were precluded
by plain language in the Renslow opinion limiting its application to
"'cases arising out of future conduct."' 98  Because the plaintiffs'
grandmother ingested DES twenty years prior to the Renslow
decision, the defendant's negligent action was deemed outside the
scope of Renslow's prospective holding.'99 The court refused to
remark on the permissibility of preconception pharmaceutical claims
triggered by activity after the date of the Renslow decision?'" A
specially concurring justice voiced concern about the "unnecessarily
premature cut-off of claims by DES grandchildren. '"2 1" The
concurring opinion points out that while the Renslow court expressed
concerns about the "potential for perpetual claims arising for chemical
accident or long-term radiation exposure,"' the likelihood that "DES
generations will .. . cease at the third-generational stage . .. is
probably assured." 0 3
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.2' is a non-DES
pharmaceuticals case in which preconception negligence was claimed.
The plaintiff in Wells alleged that her mother's use of a spermicide
contraceptive jelly proximately caused five birth defects: "(1) a cleft
(Resnick, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion). The dissent could "discern no
sound basis, in law or public policy, for holding that there is no duty owed" to the
plaintiff. Id. at 702. Moreover, the dissent noted that "in strict products liability
claims, unlike causes of action sounding in negligence, the concepts of duty and
foreseeability are of diminished significance." Id. at 703.
193. See Sparapany v. Rexall Corp., 618 N.E.2d 1098, 1101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
194. Id. at 1100.
195. Id
196. Id.
197. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 100-09 for a discussion of Renslow v.
Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977).
198. Sparapany, 618 N.E.2d at 1101 (quoting Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1256).
199. Id.
200. See id at 1101-02.
201. Id. at 1102 (Greiman, J., specially concurring).
202. Id. (quoting Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1250).
203. Id. Two additional courts have issued brief orders denying third-generation
DES liability. See Sorrells v. Eli Lilly & Co., 737 F. Supp. 678 (D.D.C. 1990); Loerch
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 445 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1989) (en banc).
204. 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 741 (11 th Cir. 1986).
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lip; (2) an abnormal formation and shortening of her right hand; (3)
the absence of the distal joint of her right ring finger; (4) the complete
lack of a left arm; and (5) only partial development of the left clavicle
and shoulder." 25 The plaintiff claimed that the spermicide caused the
defects through one of four mechanisms: "(1) injury to a sperm that
ultimately fertilizes an egg; (2) injury to an unfertilized egg; (3) injury
to a fertilized egg or zygote; or (4) injury to the developing fetus,
either by direct contact with the fetus or by absorption by the
mother."2 6  Two medical experts testified to the possibility of
preconception injury through the first two mechanisms. 207 While the
court ultimately found the fourth mechanism the most plausible, 20 1 it
did not rule out the alternative theories. 29 Neither the district court
nor the circuit court, however, explicitly evaluated the permissibility
of a preconception tort cause of action in the pharmaceuticals context.
The near universal denial of a cause of action for preconception
harm from pharmaceutical products is striking in light of the doctrine
of strict liability for products that are unreasonably dangerous in
manufacture or design.210  The next section reveals a similar
phenomenon in automobile accident cases. While harm arising out of
automobile accidents is almost universally actionable,2 11 courts have
been reluctant to allow a cause of action for individuals harmed as a
result of car accidents occurring before they were conceived.
3. Preconception Automobile Accident Cases
Claims of preconception negligence have met their strongest
opposition in the automobile accident context. Three courts have
evaluated preconception car accident claims, and not one has
recognized a cause of action. This approach makes sense in that a
driver can be expected to foresee harm to a woman he strikes with his
car but cannot be expected to foresee, and guard against, harm to a
child the injured woman conceives several years after the accident. At
the same time, singling out preconception car accident claims for
205. Id. at 267.
206. Id. at 268.
207. Id. at 273,275-76 n.18.
208. See id. at 292.
209. Id. at 292 n.39.
210. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) ("One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer...
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer ...."). The Restatement indicates that liability attaches "although (a) the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b)
the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller." Id.
211. See Green, supra note 18, at 1423 (commenting that liability properly attaches
where automobile accidents give rise to injuries that could not reasonably have been
foreseen).
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across-the-board rejection is anomalous in light of the near-universal
duty of care that attaches to operating an automobile.-
The Supreme Court of Georgia evaluated a preconception
automobile accident claim and held for the defendant in McAuley v.
Wills. 213 The prospective mother in McAuley was rendered paraplegic
in a car accident with the defendant. 24 Almost a year and a half after
the accident, she gave birth to a child who "died the following day
from cardiac arrest caused by the infant's inability, due to the
mother's paraplegia, to pass through the fetal course in an uneventful
manner."2 15 The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the
defendant driver could not owe a duty of care to a child not conceived
when the car accident occurred.1 6 The court of appeals, sitting en
banc, affirmed the trial court, with five judges holding that the claim
was barred by a two-year statute of limitations, two judges concurring
on the ground that proximate cause was lacking, and three judges
dissenting.21  The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the
concurrence and affirmed the dismissal based on proximate cause.2 18
Significantly, the McAuley court noted: "To the extent that the trial
court ruled that a person owes no duty of care toward an unconceived
child, we must disagree. '21 9 The court cited Bergstreser, Jorgensen,
and Renslow as precedents for a preconception duty of care. '22
However, the majority found that "the delivery of the child in a
manner incompatible with the mother's paraplegia constituted an
intervening act not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the car
crash," thus ending the chain of proximate causation. - '
Eight years after McAuley, a California court of appeals reviewed a
preconception automobile accident tort claim and reached the same
212 See id.
213. 303 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. 1983).
214. Id. at 258.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 258-59.
21& Id at 260-61.
219. Id. at 260.
220. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69, 100-09, 170-75 for discussions of
Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978), Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367
N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977), and Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., 483 F.2d 237 (10th
Cir. 1973), respectively.
221. McAuley, 303 S.E.2d at 260. Two judges wrote dissenting opinions in
McAuley. Judge Weltner's dissent disagreed with the majority's proximate cause
determination. Id. at 261-63 (Weltner, J., dissenting). Judge Smith's dissent stated
that proximate cause was a question for the jury and that the viability of the plaintiff's
claim properly hinged on the issue of duty. Id. at 264 (Smith, J., dissenting).
According to the Smith dissent, "the defendant owed a duty of care to avoid
preconception injury to McAuley's child." Id. at 266. Smith was not concerned about
deferring to the state legislature with regard to creating a novel cause of action
because "[r]ecognition of a preconception tort is a proper exercise of [the] court's
lawmaking function." Id at 265-66.
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outcome, though by different reasoning. 2  In Hegyes v. Unjian
Enterprises, the plaintiff's mother, as a result of injuries suffered in a
car accident with the defendant's employee, "was fitted with a lumbo-
peritoneal shunt."'  When the mother became pregnant two years
later, the fetus pressed against the shunt, necessitating a premature
delivery by Caesarean section. 4  The plaintiff alleged personal
injuries arising out of the premature delivery, not the prenatal contact
with the shunt.22 The only issue on appeal in Hegyes was stated as
follows: "Does a negligent motorist owe a legal duty of care to the
subsequently conceived child of a woman who is injured in an
automobile accident? ' 226  The court answered this question in the
negative, holding that there is no preconception duty of care in the
absence of products liability or professional negligence. 7
Although the facts of Hegyes do not suggest a "wrongful life" cause
of action, the majority began its analysis with wrongful life because
the plaintiff asserted that theory and because wrongful life was
"analytically similar" to the plaintiff's claim." The court identified a
"prevailing principle" limiting recovery in wrongful life cases to
circumstances where a special relationship gives rise to a duty of care,
an element found lacking in Hegyes.29  Analyzing several
preconception tort cases from other jurisdictions, the court recognized
an important distinction. In wrongful life cases, the negligence of the
defendant causes the conception or birth of a child who happens to be
disabled, whereas in preconception tort cases, the negligence of the
defendant causes the disability itself."
The Hegyes majority criticized the Renslon 2 1 and Bergstrese 32
courts for improperly expanding prenatal tort law to include
preconception negligence. 3 The court found three New York cases
persuasive, most notably Albala, 34 in which the court asked
presciently, "'were we to establish liability in this case, could we
logically preclude liability in a case where a negligent motorist collides
with another vehicle containing a female passenger who...
222. See Hegyes v. Unjian Enter. Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
223. Id. at 86.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 86 & n.2
226. Id. at 87.
227. Id. at 89.
228. Id. at 88. See infra Part I.C. for a discussion of wrongful life doctrine.
229. Id. at 93.
230. See id. at 94.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 100-09 for a discussion of Renslow v.
Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69 for a discussion of Bergstreser v.
Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978)).
233. Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
234. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of Albala v. City
of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786,788 (1981).
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subsequently gives birth to a deformed child?"'' 5  Although the
McAuley court declined to impose liability on a motorist for
preconception negligence on grounds of proximate cause, the Hegyes
majority cited McAuley as authority for the absence of a duty of
care. 6 This is especially striking in that McAuley explicitly rejected
the Georgia trial court's finding of no duty."
The majority in Hegyes pointed out an interesting conundrum
relevant in many preconception tort cases. If the treating physician
failed to warn the plaintiff's mother of possible harms to future
children caused by the internal injuries sustained, then an
"intervening act of malpractice" would serve to cut off a defendant's
liability. 8 On the other hand, if the doctor advised the plaintiff's
mother of the risks and she decided to have a child regardless, then
the plaintiff's intervening act of conception would serve to cut off
liability. 9 In either scenario, the defendant's liability is cut off by an
intervening negligent act or omission.
On the basis of foreseeability, the Hegyes court distinguished
medical cases finding a preconception duty of care from auto accident
cases implicating a possible preconception duty. -' While a doctor's
actions might foreseeably lead to the conception of a child, a
motorist's actions do not bear any relation to the conception and birth
of children.241 The court admitted that the injury in the Hegyes case
was within the realm of foreseeable possibility, but held that a "mere
possibility of occurrence" is not enough to establish foreseeability
sufficient to create a duty of care. 42 In support of its holding, the
court contrasted the presence of statutorily-created preconception
duties in the medical context against the absence of such duties in
motor vehicle statutes.243 From a fairness viewpoint, the majority
declared that the implications of finding a duty of care would be
"staggering" because every time the plaintiff conceived another child,
the defendant might "once again be hailed [sic] into court."2"
235. Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 97 (quoting AIbala, 429 N.E.2d at 788) (emphasis
omitted).
236. Id. at 99.
237. McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258,260 (Ga. 1983).
23& Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
239. Id.
240. See id at 101.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 103.
243. Id. at 100-01 (noting that California Vehicle Code § 17150 creates liablility for
injuries to persons, but that the definition of "person" in California Civil Code § 29
includes only individuals already conceived).
244. Id. at 93. Associate Justice Johnson, dissenting in Hegyes, claimed that the
California Supreme Court had already created a preconception duty of care. Id. at 105
(Johnson, J., dissenting) (noting that in the wrongful life case Turpin v. Sortini, 643
P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982), the California Supreme Court stated that if the plaintiff's
deafness had stemmed from the defendant's tort rather than natural causes, recovery
would have been permitted). Even if the case were one of first impression, however,
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A third plaintiff tested the viability of an auto accident
preconception tort claim in Taylor v. Cutler,245 a New Jersey case. In
Taylor, the defendant, driving while intoxicated, became involved in a
car accident with the plaintiff's mother, causing multiple, serious
injuries.246 The plaintiff's mother was hospitalized over twenty-five
times and underwent more than fifteen surgeries.2 47 Seven years after
the accident, she conceived and bore a son (the plaintiff) who had to
be delivered by Caesarean section due to his mother's pelvic
injuries.248 The child suffered from craniosynostosis, a condition in
which injuries to the head and face impair hearing and vision.249
Doctors attributed the child's birth defects to the fact that his
developing skull was situated amid his mother's "broken, deformed
pelvic bones.""0 While the court expressed sympathy for the child, it
upheld the trial court's determination that the defendant did not owe
Johnson argued that a duty of care should be found under the factors enunciated in
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), namely,
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a
duty to exercise care, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved.
Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 111. Johnson's dissent labored mainly over the issue of
foreseeability and concluded that the court's function is not to determine whether the
particular injury is a foreseeable result of the particular action of the defendant. Id. at
112. Rather, the court's task is to "evaluate more generally whether the category of
negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm
experienced." Id. (citing Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1986)). Once this
threshold has been passed, duty is established, and the case may go to a jury. Id.
The Hegyes dissent registered some noteworthy arguments in applying the
remaining Rowland factors to the plaintiffs claim. On the fairness of imposing a
burden on motorists, the dissent stated: "Compared to the millions of people toward
whom drivers already owe a duty of care, the handful of post-conceived children
whose injuries they might proximately cause represent an infinitesimal increment -
like a single sliver of straw dropped on a haystack." Id. at 116. The dissent expressed
skepticism that "the present burden is so heavy and drivers already are so careful we
should not increase the burden or enhance the degree of care any further than we
already have." Id. The ready availability of car insurance to cover plaintiffs' injuries
without raising insurance rates appreciably helped tip the balance in favor of
imposing a duty of care. Id.
245. 703 A.2d 294 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). The New Jersey Superior
Court's decision was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in a four-sentence
per curiam opinion. See Taylor v. Cutler, 724 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1999). The New Jersey
Supreme Court expressed its substantial agreement with the appellate court's
reasoning. See id. at 793.




250. Id. at 295-96.
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a duty of care to an unconceived child, and there was no cause of
action for preconception negligence.51
The Taylor court determined that the plaintiff's cause of action
hinged on the existence of a duty of care grounded in the concept of
foreseeability.12 As in Hegyes, the Taylor majority recognized a
distinction between foreseeability in the context of duty and
foreseeability in the context of proximate cause?-" In the duty
context, the question is "whether or not probable harm to one in the
position of th[e] injured plaintiff... should reasonably have been
anticipated from defendant's conduct."'  In the proximate cause
context, the issue is "'whether the specific act or omission of the
defendant was such that the ultimate injury to the plaintiff was a
reasonably foreseeable result.1'1'1 5 Ultimately, the court stated that
the recognition of a duty of care hinged on whether the defendant
knew or should have known that unconceived children were at risk of
injury from the defendant's tortious conduct.2- The court concluded
that the defendant had no way of knowing that her negligent driving
posed a risk of harm to a child born seven years later.-"
The Taylor court offered two hypotheticals to illustrate the
unreasonable expansion of liability represented by the imposition of a
preconception duty of care on motorists. First, the court suggested
that a negligent driver should not be held liable if a person he injures
blacks out while driving seven years later and injures a third party.s
Second, the court suggested that a driver should not be held liable for
child abuse if his negligence causes psychiatric damage to another
motorist, who in turn abuses a child conceived after the accident. 59 In
concluding its foreseeability analysis, the court added that the
unconceived child "was not within the 'zone of danger' created by
defendant's negligent operation of her vehicle. ' '2W From a policy
standpoint, the court characterized the deterrent effect of
preconception liability as "speculative at best." '
251. Id at 296, 303.
252. Id at 296-97.
253. Id. at 297.
254. Id. (quoting Hill v. Yaskin, 380 A.2d 1107 (NJ. 1977) (omission in original).
255. Id. (quoting Hill, 380 A.2d 1107).
256. Id. at 299.
257. Id. at 299-300.
258. Id. at 300.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. Judge Dreier, dissenting in Taylor, would have remanded the case to the
trial court with the instruction that a preconception cause of action is permissible in
the auto accident context. Id. at 306 (Dreier, PJ., dissenting). Dreier's dissent posed
its own hypothetical, asserting that if a driver crashed into a building, resulting in its
collapse ten months later, a newborn child injured in the collapse would be able to
make a claim against the driver. Id. at 304. "If we then change the structure from a
building to the mother's pelvis.., we have translated the hypothetical to the matter
which we now review." Id. The dissent reasoned that "it is neither far-fetched nor
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Courts have refrained from letting preconception automobile cases
go to trial even though the harm in such cases is limited to a small
class of plaintiffs, namely, children conceived by mothers with uterine
injuries from prior car accidents. The next section looks at
preconception toxic exposure cases, where the class of plaintiffs
potentially harmed can, by contrast, span generations.
4. Toxic Substance Exposure Cases
A final preconception negligence category has arisen out of
exposure to toxic substances. Most of the cases within this category
involve employees who were exposed to a toxic substance and claimed
that their exposure led to chromosomal abnormalities in their
children. In some cases, however, the plaintiff has claimed a prenatal
injury, and the defendant employer has sought dismissal on the
ground that the exposure occurred prior to the plaintiff's conception,
before a duty of care existed.
In a case reminiscent of the negligently-repaired furnace
hypothetical posed by the Martin court,26 an Indiana court of appeals
affirmed a jury's denial of recovery to a child injured in utero from his
mother's exposure to carbon monoxide.263 The plaintiff in Second
National Bank v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. was not conceived at the time
the defendant's employee installed a furnace in the child's prospective
residence.26 When the child's mother was seven months pregnant
with the plaintiff, a downdraft in the furnace flue pipe exposed her to
carbon monoxide fumes. 265 The plaintiffs claim that his cerebral palsy
was attributable to the defective installation of the furnace was
allowed to proceed to a jury, which rendered a verdict for the
defendant.2 66 The argument that Sears did not owe a duty of care to
an unconceived individual does not appear to have been raised, but
the fact that the case was allowed to proceed to trial indicates that the
court found the duty element satisfied.
Two New York cases have evaluated liability where a party alleged
that injuries stemmed from preconception exposure to ethylene oxide
("EtO"). 267 In Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., the plaintiff
lacking reasonable foreseeability to imagine that a later-conceived child gestating
within the damaged structure of the mother's pelvis might be injured." Id. According
to Dreier's dissent, principles of proximate cause would serve to cut off liability in
situations where a long delay or intervening act between accident and injury rendered
the plaintiff's claim less compelling. Id. at 305.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.
263. See Second Nat'l Bank v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 390 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979).
264. Id. at 230.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Mann v. H.W. Andersen Prods. Inc., 246 A.D.2d 68 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998); Catherwood v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
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claimed that her chromosomal birth defect was proximately caused by
her mother's preconception exposure to EtO in the workplace.2-  The
court, pointing out that New York does not recognize a preconception
duty of care, dismissed the plaintiffs claim. 69 The opinion expressed
concern about "the proliferation of frivolous claims and claims where
proof presents a hardship to defendants.""0
Mann v. H.W. Anderson Products, Inc. is noteworthy in that the
defendant raised preconception negligence as a shield against
liability. 71 The plaintiff in Mann alleged that his mother's exposure to
EtO in the workplace, while pregnant, caused his birth defects. - - The
defendant, in support of its motion for summary judgment, countered
"that the plaintiff was not harmed in utero, but, rather, that his
condition was genetically predetermined before he was conceived,
which would render his claim a legally untenable preconception
tort."'273 While the court found merit in the defense's argument, it
decided that the plaintiffs competing claim of postconception injury
precluded judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law. 4
Utility workers brought an unsuccessful claim for damages from
preconception exposure to nuclear radiation in the Illinois federal
case Coley v. Commonwealth Edison Co.75  Two male
Commonwealth Edison ("CoinEd") employees who worked at the
same facility fathered children, three years apart, who suffered from
the chromosomal disorder Trisomy 18.276 The court granted summary
judgment to the defendant on two grounds: first, ComEd's
compliance with regulations precluded a finding of negligence-' and
second, there was scant scientific evidence connecting Trisomy 18 to
paternal radiation exposure.27  Rather than holding that the
defendant owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, the court ruled that no
reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff in light of the applicable
regulations and the facts presented. 279
As in the Mann case, the defendant in Hitachi Chemical Electro-
Products, Inc. v. Gurley-20 unsuccessfully raised preconception
negligence as a shield to liability. In Hitachi, two plaintiffs alleged
268. Catherwood, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
269. Id. at 706.
270. Id.
271. Mann, 246 A.D.2d at 73.
272 Id. at 70.
273. Id. at 73.
274. Id. at 73-74.
275. 768 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
276. Id. at 626. The disorder is one in which maternal or paternal chromosome 18
fails to divide during the reproductive process, causing a chromosome deficiency and
shortened lifespan in the child. Id.
277. Id. at 628-29.
278. Id. at 629-30.
279. Id.
280. 466 S.E.2d 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
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birth defects from exposure to hazardous chemicals through their
parents, three of whom were employees at a Hitachi semi-conductor
factory.281 Hitachi sought dismissal insofar as the claims alleged
preconception negligence. m The Georgia Court of Appeals pointed
out that the plaintiffs had not sought compensation for preconception
negligence, but rather had made an ordinary prenatal tort claim.,83
Moreover, the Hitachi court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
"even if plaintiffs' complaint had specifically sought preconception
damages, Hitachi's contention that such a claim is barred by common
law is without merit."'  The court quoted the Georgia Supreme
Court's statement in McAuley that "'at least in some situations, a
person should be under a duty of care toward an unconceived
child."'"8
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the
permissibility of preconception tort causes of action. In UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 86 however, Justice White's concurring
opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy, noted the
growing acceptance of preconception tort claims.28 Johnson Controls
was a class action suit brought by female workers contesting the
defendant employer's policy of prohibiting all fertile women from
performing tasks exposing them to lead in concentrations exceeding
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) standards.288
White's concurrence noted the employer's interest in avoiding
preconception liability:
Common sense tells us that it is a part of the normal operation of
business concerns to avoid causing injury to third parties.., if for no
other reason than to avoid tort liability .... This possibility of tort
liability is not hypothetical; ... an increasing number of courts have
recognized a right to recover even for prenatal injuries caused by
torts committed prior to conception. 89
White's comments about preconception torts are only a sidebar within
a concurring opinion, but they demonstrate the expanding reach and
growing import of preconception negligence law.
C. Distinguishing Wrongful Life Claims from Preconception Torts
Wrongful life claims are those in which a plaintiff asserts both an
impaired existence and negligence on the part of the defendant which
281. Id. at 867-68.
282. Id. at 868.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. (quoting McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258,260 (Ga. 1983)).
286. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
287. Id. at 213 (White, J., concurring).
288. Id. at 190-92.
289. Id. at 212-13 (White, J., concurring).
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caused the existence but not the specific impairment.-" There are
three main factual predicates to wrongful life cases: (1) negligent
performance of a sterilization operation, resulting in the birth of an
unplanned child who happens to be impaired;-" (2) failure to provide
genetic counseling (or the provision of inaccurate genetic counseling),
leading to the birth of a child with a genetic defect; ' or (3) failure to
offer amniocentesis, thus depriving parents of the opportunity to
abort a child with an abnormality? 3 Some wrongful life claims might
be categorized as preconception torts in that a negligent act by the
tortfeasor leads to the conception of a person with an impaired
existence. Wrongful life claims, however, are significantly different
from the preconception cases discussed in the previous section. In a
wrongful life claim, the plaintiff would not have enjoyed the
offsetting benefit of existence were it not for the negligent act of the
defendant.2" In preconception tort cases, the plaintiff would have
enjoyed existence without impairment if not for the defendant's
negligence. Courts have generally rejected wrongful life claims on the
basis that allowing a cause of action would entail an improper policy
judgment that nonexistence is preferable to existence in an impaired
state.295 In addition, wrongful life claims run counter to the Second
Restatement of Torts position: "When the defendant's tortious
conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so
doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages." '296 The benefit rule poses an insurmountable
challenge to plaintiffs who have the negligent act of the defendant to
thank for their very existence.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, for example, held that a
physician whose negligent genetic counseling led to the conception
and birth of an impaired child could not be held liable for the child's
injuries.297 The plaintiff's parents in Viccaro v. Milunsky consulted
with a genetics specialist "concerning the possibility that [the mother]
might have, or be a carrier of, a genetic disorder known as ectodermal
290. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 291, at 792 (2000); Pilar N. Ossorio,
Prenatal Genetic Testing and the Courts, in Prenatal Testing Disability and Rights 308,
319-22 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000).
291. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen.
Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (La. 1988).
292. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 955 (Cal. 1982); Viccaro v. Milunsky,
551 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1990).
293. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809 (N.Y. 1978); Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528,530 (N.C. 1985).
294. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 (1977) (stating the rule that a
plaintiff cannot recover if the defendant's tort conferred a benefit outweighing any
harm inflicted on the plaintiff).
295. Dobbs, supra note 290, § 291, at 792.
296. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920.
297. Viccaro, 551 N.E.2d at 9, 12.
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dysplasia. '298 After being assured that the mother did not have the
disease, the couple bore a son who was "severely afflicted with
anhidrotic ectodermal dysplasia. ''299 The parents brought a claim, on
the son's behalf, for wrongful life.3" The court rejected this claim
because "there is a fundamental problem of logic if [the child] were
allowed to recover against the defendant .... The almost universal
rule in this country is that a physician is not liable to a child who was
born because of the physician's negligence."30 1 The majority opinion
stated that the physician simply did not breach any duty.3"
A recent Massachusetts lower court opinion provides a nice
illustration of the distinction between preconception tort and
wrongful life. In Doolan v. IVF America (MA), Inc., 33 the plaintiff's
parents were known carriers of the gene for cystic fibrosis. 304 They
asked the defendant IVF clinic to perform a test for the disease on the
embryo that was ultimately implanted in the mother.0 5 The clinic
advised the parents that the embryo did not have the genetic mutation
for cystic fibrosis, when in fact the embryo contained the mutation. 6
The plaintiff child, afflicted with cystic fibrosis, attempted a
preconception tort claim, but the court concluded that the case was
for wrongful life.307 The court reasoned that the plaintiff's claim was
"not that the alleged negligence of the defendants caused him to be
born with cystic fibrosis, but rather that the alleged negligence...
denied his parents the opportunity to choose not to conceive and give
birth to him. '38
II. THE INCONSISTENCY AND INADEQUACY OF CURRENT
PRECONCEPTION TORT LAW
A substantial body of preconception tort case law has developed
over the past thirty years. This part explores the inconsistency of the
analytical approaches and outcomes of these cases. Problematically, a
child who enters the world "carrying the seal of another's fault" might
recover in one jurisdiction but be left without a remedy in another.3 9
In addition, this part suggests that the emergence of advanced assisted
reproductive technologies implicating preconception injury, as well as
the prospect of preconception gene therapy, makes it increasingly
298. Id. at 9.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 12.
301. Id.
302. See id. at 13.
303. No. 99-3476, 2000 LEXIS 581 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000).
304. Id. at *2.
305. Id. at *2-3.
306. Id. at *4.
307. Id. at *9.
308. Id. at *11-12.
309. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337,345.
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likely that courts will face an influx of preconception tort claims. As
such, the time is ripe for courts to develop a better approach to
preconception negligence to meet the challenges posed by advances in
science and medicine.
A. Disarray Among and Within Jurisdictions
On the surface, courts seem to be consistent in the way they handle
various types of preconception tort claims. For example, seven out of
nine courts that have reviewed Rh sensitization cases have permitted
a cause of action based on preconception negligence.3"" The two
jurisdictions holding otherwise did so on the basis of statutes of
limitations rather than common law tort principles."' All five
jurisdictions that have examined third generation DES claims have
denied them.312 Likewise, all three courts that have been presented
with preconception claims arising out of car accidents have denied a
cause of action.313 More broadly, courts that have evaluated causes of
action based upon preconception negligence have generally found
that the existence or nonexistence of a duty of care flowing to the
unconceived child is critical to the analysis. 4
Beneath this patina of uniformity, however, a more complicated
picture may be uncovered. Even where the outcomes of cases are
consistent, the legal analyses employed by the courts are often very
different. For example, in the Rh sensitization cases, where the
physician-patient relationship usually creates a duty of care, four
courts did not undertake a duty analysis, focusing instead on statutes
of limitations.315 Two of these concluded that recovery was barred
because the relevant statute ran from the date the mother was injured
or should have discovered her injury.316 Implicit in these holdings is
that the relevant injury was to the mother, not the later-conceived
child, thus undercutting the idea of a duty of care to the child.
While the courts have been more consistent in the denial of third
generation DES claims, this consistency diminishes if the DES cases
are placed in the broader category of pharmaceutical products cases.
In denying a third generation DES claim, the New York Court of
Appeals worried about making DES plaintiffs "a favored class for
310. See supra Part I.B.l.b and accompanying notes.
311. See supra note 153.
312. See supra Part I.B.2 and accompanying notes.
313. See supra Part I.B.3.
314. See Hegyes v. Unjian Enter., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (I11. 1977): McNulty v.
McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904, 906-07 (Mass. 1993); Albala v. City of New York, 429
N.E.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. 1981). But see McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258,260 (Ga. 1983)
(finding that a preconception negligence claim failed on grounds of proximate
causation).
315. See supra Part I.B.l.b and accompanying notes.
316. See supra note 153.
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whose benefit all traditional limitations on tort liability must give
way. 317  Ironically, however, the DES cases are the only
pharmaceutical products preconception claims to date in which a
cause of action has been denied.318 Jorgensen (birth control pills) and
Wells (spermicide jelly) may be distinguished from the third
generation DES claims in that the injuries in Jorgensen and Wells
occurred shortly after the negligent conduct, whereas the injuries in
the DES cases occurred decades afterward.319 Courts, however, have
not barred preconception Rh sensitization claims even though the
harms in many of those cases are realized several years after the
negligent activity.32° Moving to the auto accident cases, the Taylor
and Hegyes courts denied preconception tort claims, holding that the
motorist owed no duty of care to the future child of the accident
victim. 32' The McAuley court, in contrast, affirmed the existence of a
duty of care but chose to deny relief on grounds of proximate cause.32
The jurisdictional division in preconception torts is sharpest
between New York and Georgia. New York has articulated a bright-
line no duty rule, barring claims in the medical care,32 pharmaceutical
products,3 4 and toxic substance325 contexts. Georgia, on the other
hand, has allowed preconception claims to proceed in both
pharmaceutical products 326 and toxic substances327 cases. The Georgia
Supreme Court would have gone so far as to allow a preconception
tort claim arising from an auto accident had a physician's intervening
act of negligence not subverted the element of proximate cause.328
Most jurisdictions that have found a preconception duty of care have,
like Georgia, found such a duty across contexts. 329 The New Jersey
courts, however, have found a duty to the unconceived in Rh
sensitization cases,330 but not in automobile accident cases. 331
317. Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198,201 (N.Y. 1991).
318. See supra Part I.B.2.
319. See supra Part I.B.2.
320. See supra Part I.B.l.b.
321. See supra Part I.B.3.
322. See McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258,259-260 (Ga. 1983).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 176-86.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 267-74.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 204-09.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 280-85.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 213-21.
329. For example, the Michigan courts have allowed preconception tort claims in
both negligent surgery and rubella cases. See supra text accompanying notes 88-97,
155-60. Missouri has upheld preconception negligence claims in both medical
malpractice and Rh sensitization cases. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69, 130-
39. The Oklahoma courts have allowed preconception claims in the context of both
Rh sensitization and harm from pharmaceutical products. See supra text
accompanying notes 120-29, 170-75.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 146-53.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 245-61.
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Although there have been multiple preconception tort cases over
the past thirty years, there is no consensus among, and sometimes
within, jurisdictions about the framework of analysis. This may prove
problematic at a time when the emergence of new genetic and assisted
reproductive technologies promises to lend added significance to this
area of tort law. As advances in medical science enable doctors to
manipulate reproductive cells and the DNA contained within prior to
conception, the possibility of harm through preconception negligence
will be greatly magnified.
B. Medical Advances and Preconception Torts
Preconception claims are still relatively rare, but cutting-edge
reproductive technologies pose the risk of an increased incidence of
preconception and multigenerational injuries. The current state of
disarray within the courts becomes even more troublesome in light of
emerging reproductive technologies, and possibly gene therapy,r
which threaten to expand upon the number and character of
preconception tort claims.
Preconception negligence claims to date can be put in two fault-
based categories. Cases belonging to the first category are those in
which the tortfeasor's negligence causes the ultimate harm to the
plaintiff but does not cause the plaintiff's conception. The medical
malpractice, pharmaceutical products, auto accident, and toxic
substance cases all fit within this category.333 Renslow, for example,
illustrates this category of case. 31 The doctor in Renslow negligently
transfused a female, Rh-negative patient with Rh-positive blood and
thus was responsible for the harm to the later-conceived Rh-positive
child.335 The doctor, however, had nothing to do with his patient's
independent act of conceiving a child. 31
The second category consists of cases in which the negligent actor is
responsible for the conception of the plaintiff but is not otherwise
responsible for the harm suffered. The wrongful life cases comprise
this category. For example, in Viccaro, the physician's negligent
genetic counseling was directly responsible for the parents' decision to
conceive a child.337 The child's ectodermal dysplasia, however, was a
genetic disorder stemming from natural causes, not from any medical
intervention.
332. See Gina Kolata, Scientists Report The First Success of Gene Therapy, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 28, 2000, at Al (reporting on successful use of gene therapy in France to
cure three infants of severe combined immune deficiency).
333. See supra Part I.B.1-4.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 100-109 for a discussion of Renslow.
335. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (I11. 1977).
336. See id.
337. Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1990). See supra text
accompanying notes 297-302 for a discussion of Viccaro.
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What the courts have not faced, but is on the near horizon, is a third
possibility-a case in which the tortfeasor is responsible, through
preconception negligence, for both conception and specific injury.
With the mapping of the human genome33 s and the attendant promise
of breakthroughs in gene therapy,339 an illustrative hypothetical is easy
to imagine. Take, for example, a husband and wife of Jewish ancestry
who have decided not to have children because the husband carries
the recessive gene for Tay-Sachs and their children would have a one
in four chance of suffering from this terrible disease.30  With the
advent of germ-line gene therapy in the coming years, 4 suppose that
the husband could undergo a procedure in which the Tay-Sachs gene
is excised from his reproductive cells. Let us imagine further that a
doctor performs the gene therapy technique negligently and the result
is a daughter who does not suffer from Tay-Sachs but instead suffers
from a genetic defect causing moderate impairment over a normal
lifespan. Under the current wrongful life jurisprudence of most
jurisdictions, the child's cause of action should be barred because she
would not have been conceived if it were not for the services provided
by the gene therapist, and she cannot claim that the life she has,
impaired though it might be, is worse than no life at all. Such a
scenario tests the outer limits of wrongful life doctrine.
In light of recent developments in gene mapping,2 the previous
hypothetical is within the realm of educated conjecture rather than
science fiction. It is not necessary to speculate, however, in order to
encounter assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) that
simultaneously provide avenues for conception and raise risks of
injury. Two ARTs currently in practice fit this description.
In vitro ovum nuclear transplantation (IVONT) applies the
technique used to clone Dolly the sheep to the context of human
338. See Nicholas Wade, Genetic Code of Human Life is Cracked by Scientists, N.Y.
Times, June 27,2000, at Al.
339. See Lawrence K. Altman, Genomic Chief Has High Hopes, and Great Fears,
for Genetic Testing, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2000, at F6 (reporting on the statements of
Francis S. Collins, head of the Human Genome Project of the National Institutes of
Health, about the genetic testing and gene therapy implications of human genome
mapping).
340. See Stedman's Medical Dictionary 504 (26th ed. 1995) (indicating that Tay-
Sachs, which is transmitted by a recessive gene, causes blindness, seizures, and,
ultimately, death within the first few years of life).
341. See Altman, supra note 339 (indicating that, according to Francis S. Collins of
the Human Genome Project, gene therapy should be available for most diseases by
the year 2040); see also LeRoy Walters & Julie Gage Palmer, The Ethics of Human
Gene Therapy 62 (1997) (indicating that "[gierm-line gene therapy involves a
therapeutic genetic alteration in germ-line cells... includ[ing] gametes (reproductive
cells, such as sperm and egg cells) as well as the cells from which they are derived").
Walters and Palmer note that germ-line therapy is advantageous because the genetic
improvements are passed down to succeeding generations. Id. at 62-63.
342. See Wade, supra note 338.
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assisted reproduction. 3 Though the procedure has not yet been
successful in a documented case, iVONT is designed to assist infertile
women who wish to have their own biological children.-' Doctors
remove the nucleus from a donated egg and replace it with the
nucleus of an egg from the infertile prospective mother.,* The
resulting "hybrid egg" is fertilized in vitro and implanted in the
infertile woman's womb.346 While IVONT may confer the benefit of
biological parenthood on women who in the past would have been
limited to adoption or conventional egg donation, scientists and
ethicists have raised concerns about the riskiness of the procedure.
One problem is that the nuclear DNA from the prospective mother is
not the only material relevant to the formation of the resulting
baby.4 7 The mitochondrial DNA in the donated egg's cytoplasm will
also contribute to the genetic composition of the child." In addition,
the donor egg's cytoplasm, which surrounds the mother's nucleus,
plays a role in how the genes are expressed.- 9 Researchers are
unsure, at this point, about the consequences of combining one
woman's genetic information wvith another, usually younger, woman's
cytoplasm. 50 One developmental biologist told the New York Times
that "similar experiments in mice ha[ve] resulted in abnormalities that
were passed on to succeeding generations" and that "'[w]e have no
idea what the potential is for birth defects, or problems in children in
the next generation."'351  Even if IVONT is proven to be free of
inherent genetic injury, there remains the possibility that human error
in carrying out nuclear transfer could result in harm to a child
conceived with the hybrid egg.
Unlike WONT, intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) is an ART
that has enjoyed widespread use since it was first attempted in 1992.12
ICSI assists a couple in conceiving a child when the prospective father
is infertile due to insufficient numbers of sperm (oligospermia), a total
343. Denise Grady, Doctors Using Hybrid Egg to Tackle Infertility in Older





348. See id.; see also Mark S. Frankel & Audrey R. Chapman, Human Inheritable
Genetic Modifications: Assessing Scientific, Ethical, Religious, and Policy Issues 11
(report prepared by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Sept.
2000).
349. See Grady, supra note 343.
350. Id.
351. I. (quoting Temple University developmental biologist Keith Latham).
352. See E.R. Te Velde et al., Concerns About Assisted Reproduction, 351 Lancet
1524 (1998) (indicating that as of 1995 about 50,000 ICSI procedures had been
attempted worldwide and "[t]ens of thousands of ICSI children must have been born
since the technique was introduced"). But see Carl Djerassi, Ser in an Age of
Mechanical Reproduction, 285 Science 53 (1999) (providing a more conservative
estimate that over 10,000 babies have been born by means of ICSI since 1992).
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absence of sperm in the ejaculate (azoospermia), or abnormalities in
the sperm that impede fertilization (e.g., insufficient mobility) . 5 3 ICSI
specialists achieve fertilization in vitro by injecting a single sperm
from the father into the cytoplasm of the mother's egg, which is
subsequently implanted in the mother's uterus. 4 ICSI differs from
ordinary IVF in several respects. With ICSI, first, there is mechanical
penetration of the egg, using a pipette, during the fertilization
process,355 second, it is possible to select the particular sperm that will
fertilize the egg,356 and third, it is possible to achieve fertilization with
sperm which, due to abnormalities, would otherwise be unable to
penetrate the egg.35 7 The birth defect risks posed by ICSI are
summarized nicely in an article describing mild cognitive
developmental delays in children conceived by ICSI compared with
children conceived naturally or by IVF:
The ICSI procedure involves fertilisation by injection of a single
sperm directly into an oocyte, often with spermatozoa with impaired
mobility and morphology. These defects may reflect an underlying
abnormality in the sperm, therefore, use of these sperm may lead to
an increased incidence of abnormalities in the child. Also, infertile
men with oligospermia or azoospermia have an increased incidence
of chromosomal anomalies.., that may be transmitted to their
children. By selecting a single sperm for injection the ICSI
technique bypasses the usual process of natural selection which
occurs both during natural conception and in conventional IVF,
resulting in a greater chance of fertili[z]ation with abnormal sperm.
Finally, ICSI involves physical disruption of the cell membrane of
the oocyte and introduction of extraneous material into the oocyte,
together with the sperm.358
The literature has given mixed reviews on the safety of ICSI,359 and
some have suggested that it is still too early, and the available subjects
353. See Jennifer R. Bowen et al., Medical and Developmental Outcome at I Year
for Children Conceived by Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection, 351 Lancet 1529 (1998).
354. Abi Berger, What is Involved in Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection?, 7 Student
Brit. Med. J. 160 (1999).
355. Id.
356. See Gianpiero Palermo et al., Pregnancies after Intracytoplasmic Injection of
Single Spermatazoon into an Oocyte, 340 Lancet 17, 18 (1992); see also J.Y. Nau,
Regulating ICSI in France, 345 Lancet 377 (1995) (noting that ICSI "does away with
the element of 'competition' that sperm[atazoa] face with other modes of
fertilisation"). Nau also quotes Professor Georges David, founder of a center for the
conservation of sperm, as follows: "ICSI is one of the largest upheavals to the human
race because for the first time it is possible to modify and suppress certain selection
mechanisms of reproduction." Id.
357. See E. Kristine Steele et al., Science Versus Clinical Adventurism in Treatment
of Azoospermia, 353 Lancet 516 (1999) (noting that in traditional IVF, genetically
defective sperm are less likely to fertilize an egg, whereas "[ijn ICSI, natural selection
processes are eliminated, therefore any sperm injected into an oocyte might have
damaged DNA").
358. Bowen et al., supra note 353, at 1529.
359. Compare M. Bonduelle et al., Mental Development of 201 ICSI Children at 2
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for study are too few, for an accurate assessment of risk. ° However,
the weight of authority has sided with the position that ICSI presents
a risk of harm more significant than the risks entailed by ordinary IVF
or natural conception.36'
Leaving aside the idea that informed consent might relieve doctors
of liability to child as well as mother, the potential for preconception
negligence claims arising out of IVONT and ICSI is clear. With
medical ethicists worrying that these types of techniques "are already
taking place without the oversight that... is necessary,"6 2 courts can
play a role in deterring such risky procedures by eliminating existing
barriers to preconception causes of action, particularly those involving
multigenerational harms.
How society should use knowledge about the human genome and
the human reproductive process to realize benefits is a question
fraught with policy considerations. But how courts should analyze
individual tort claims alleging harm from preconception negligence
arising out of gene therapy or assisted reproduction is not strictly a
question of policy. Indeed, the traditional elements of negligence are
equipped to handle preconception tort claims. Because many
preconception negligence claims have turned on the element of duty,
the next part explains how a preconception duty of care is consistent
with the duty of care to existing persons in other negligence cases.
Years of Age, 351 Lancet 1553 (1998) (claiming that "[t]here is no indication that ICSI
children have a slower mental development than the general population"), with
Bowen et al., supra note 353, at 1529 (asserting that "there is an increased risk of mild
delays in development [of children conceived by ICSIJ at 1 year when compared with
children conceived by routine IVF or conceived naturally").
360. See, e.g., M. M. Hawkins & C. L. R. Barratt, Letter to the Editor,
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection, 286 Science 51 (1999). Hawkins, a specialist in
childhood cancer, and Barratt, a specialist in reproductive biology and genetics,
indicate that "[miore ICSI offspring must be studied before we can satisfactorily
address the question of a birth defect excess." Id. They note that a study designed to
include birth defects with an incidence of one in every thousand births would require
an ICSI group of 20,000 and a control group of the same number. Id. By contrast, one
of the largest ICSI studies thus far began with 423 ICSI offspring and was expanded to
include 877 ICSI offspring. Ida
361. See Bowen et al., supra note 353, at 1529, 1532 (noting an increased risk of
developmental delays in one-year-old children conceived by ICSI); Gina Kolata, New
Questions About Popular Fertilization Technique, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1999, at F10
(noting a report that "injection can damage proteins in the egg that push and pull
chromosomes into line before cell division and that... ICSI skews the egg's otherwise
orderly removal of proteins from sperm"); Palermo et al., supra note 356, at 18
(indicating the possibility of damage to the egg during ICSI due to the "characteristics
of the injection pipette or of the micromanipulation technique"); Steele et al., supra
note 357, at 516 (stating that "potentially damaged sperm are being used for ICSI and
the long-term outcome of such pregnancies is still unknown"); Te Velde et al., supra
note 352, at 1524 (noting that "concerns have been expressed about the potential and
long-term hazards faced by ICSI offspring... includ[ing] genetic damage, cytoplasmic
changes, contamination of sperm, or other damage caused by the technique itself").
362. Frankel & Chapman, supra note 348, at 9.
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III. A NEXUS TEST FOR DUTY AND ITS APPLICATION
Although it is possible for an intentional tort to give rise to
preconception liability,3 63 the preconception tort cases to date have
been causes of action in negligence. Of the four elements of
negligence (duty, breach, causation and injury),"6 duty has taken
center stage in preconception tort law, with causation playing a
significant supporting role.365  Breach is of diminished importance
because the issue is not whether the duty breached was the duty owed,
but whether there was a duty of care to one not yet in existence.366
Injury is likewise of diminished significance because there is generally
no dispute that the plaintiff has suffered a harm; even in a wrongful
life case there may no question that the plaintiff has suffered an injury
in the form of a birth defect, but the offsetting benefit rule serves to
preclude recovery. 67
Many courts, understandably, have turned to duty as a means of
limiting liability in the difficult preconception tort line of cases.3 68 The
argument that negligence law is grounded in duties of care owed to
others and that such duties cannot be owed to persons who do not
exist would appear to make a good deal of sense. This Note, however,
adopts the position that courts have been too quick to end the inquiry
with the duty element and that causation, specifically proximate cause,
should be the decisive factor in making out a triable case for
preconception negligence in most contexts.
A. The Nexus Test
The courts that focus on the duty element of negligence in
preconception tort cases can generally be divided into two extremes.
On the one hand, courts such as the New York Court of Appeals have
taken a doctrinal approach and pointed out the fundamental flaw
inherent in announcing a duty of care to persons not yet in
existence.36 9 On the other hand, courts such as the California Court of
Appeals eschew the rigid, formalistic approach and subscribe to the
363. For example, an assailant who injured a woman in a way that caused injury to
a subsequently-conceived child could be sued for the intentional preconception tort of
battery. In such a case, duty of care would be irrelevant, and the later-conceived child
would be able to argue a theory of transferred intent. See Keeton et al., supra note 34,
§ 8, at 37-39.
364. See id., § 30, at 164-65.
365. See Dobbs, supra note 290, § 290, at 791.
366. See id. at 789-91.
367. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 (1977) ("Benefit to Plaintiff
Resulting from Defendant's Tort"); see also supra notes 294-96 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the offsetting benefit rule.
368. See, e.g, Hegyes v. Unjian, 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); McNulty
v. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Mass. 1993); Albala v. City of New York, 429
N.E.2d 786,788 (N.Y. 1981).
369. See Albala, 429 N.E.2d at 788.
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view that duty is a stand-in for policy considerations which judges
must balance when deciding whether to allow a cause of action. "' A
court, however, need not stray from conventional negligence doctrine,
including a bona fide duty element, to permit a preconception tort
claim. In assessing duty, the natural tendency for courts is to ask the
question: duty to whom? In nonfeasance cases, a duty of care may be
predicated on a relationship (for example, landlord-tenant or doctor-
patient) between the negligent actor and the injured party.' A
preexisting relationship between the parties, however, is not the only
type of connection that is significant in the duty analysis of negligence
cases. The logical connection between the category of activity in
which the tortfeasor engaged and the category of activity in which the
plaintiff was engaged when she suffered the injury is also relevant to
the finding of a duty. A review of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad,'
the seminal case on duty, will serve as a good starting point for this
analysis.
In Palsgraf, a man carrying a nondescript package jumped aboard a
moving train and looked as if he were about to lose his balance and
fall backwards.373 One of the defendant's employees gave him a push
from behind and another pulled him aboard the train. 4 In doing so,
they dislodged the package from his arm.37 5  The package, which
contained fireworks, hit the ground and exploded. 6 The explosion
caused scales to fall from a nearby wall and injure the plaintiff, Mrs.
Palsgraf, who had been standing on the railroad platform.' Judge
Cardozo, writing for the majority, rejected Mrs. Palsgraf's cause of
action on the ground that the railroad employees may have breached
a duty of care in the way they handled the man boarding the train, but
they did not breach a like duty of care to the plaintiff.'
Scholars have pointed out that Palsgraf stands for the proposition
that a cause of action in negligence must be founded upon the breach
of a duty personal to the plaintiff. 9 That the railroad employees
breached a duty of care to the man attempting to board the train was
not enough to create a cause of action for the plaintiff, who was
370. See Hegyes, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
371. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315; see also Richard A. Epstein, Cases and
Materials on Torts 620-40 (6th ed. 1995) (discussing Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave.
Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (landlord-tenant), Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of CaL, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (doctor-patient), and other cases implicating
duties to third parties arising out of special relationships).
372. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).





378. Id at 100-01.
379. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson,
146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1733,1820 (1998).
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situated outside the ambit of the duty of care but happened to be
injured as a result of the breach. Duty skeptics have pointed out that
Palsgraf may tell us that the duty must flow to the proper party before
a plaintiff gets her day in court, but it does not tell us where the duty
comes from in the first place.3 80 As Dean Prosser has put it: "These
are shifting sands, and no fit foundation. There is a duty if the court
says there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution, is what we make
it."'38 ' Prosser accuses Cardozo of "stating dogmatic propositions
without reason or explanation. ' '31 Furthermore, if duty is about a
relationship between defendant and plaintiff, Prosser charges Cardozo
with myopically ignoring that "Mrs. Palsgraf was a passenger [and
f]rom the moment that she bought her ticket the defendant did in fact
owe her a duty of the highest care. '38 3  Prosser is conspicuously
dismissive of an opinion which, at the time of his critique, had been
good law for twenty-five years and had been followed in numerous
jurisdictions. Still standing after more than seventy years, Cardozo's
opinion in Palsgraf enjoys an enduring significance that renders
Prosser's skepticism suspect. Palsgraf may even help clarify the issue
of how it is that a person can have a duty to one not yet conceived.
At the very outset of his opinion, immediately after stating the facts
of the case, Cardozo focuses on the relationship between the
defendant's activity and the plaintiffs injury: "The conduct of the
defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the
package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far
away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all."3" This language
supports the concept that negligence with respect to one party does
not automatically establish negligence to other parties injured as a
result of the same act. The next sentences in the opinion, however,
add greater dimension to the duty inquiry. Cardozo writes: "Nothing
in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the
potency of peril to persons thus removed. Negligence is not
actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected
interest, the violation of a right."385 In these latter two sentences,
Cardozo signals that he is analyzing the duty issue when he discusses
"legally-protected interest" and "violation of a right." In assessing
duty, however, he is not merely looking for a relationship between
defendant and plaintiff, but a connection between the falling package
and a danger to plaintiff that would justify the finding of a duty.
Relationship in this sense is different from that of carrier to passenger,
or person in defendant's class to person in plaintiff's class. To
380. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 12-16 (1953).
381. Id. at 15.
382. Id. at 7.
383. Id.
384. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
385. Id.
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determine whether a duty is present, Cardozo appears to examine the
relationship between the category of activity in which the defendant
was engaged (negligently dislodging an ordinary package) and the
category and manner of injury that the plaintiff suffered (injured by a
scale knocked from a wall as the result of an explosion). This part of
the duty analysis may be termed a categorical approach to duty or a
nexus test for duty, as distinct from the duty-breach nexus necessary
to establish a negligence claim. 6
Although the term nexus is nowhere in the opinion, Cardozo
highlights the absence of a connection between the category of the
defendant's negligent activity and the category of danger that was
created. He writes:
The purpose of the [defendant's] act, as well as its effect, was to
make [the man's] person safe. If there was a wrong to him at all,
which may very well be doubted, it was a wrong to a property
interest only, the safety of his package. Out of this wrong to
property, which threatened injury to nothing else, there has passed,
we are told, to the plaintiff by derivation or succession a right of
action for the invasion of an interest of another order, the right to
bodily security. -
In short, Cardozo appears to be saying that there is no reasonable
connection between pushing a man with a package aboard a train and
detonating an explosion that injures a woman standing on a nearby
platform. "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed,"3" and here the risk was dislodging and damaging the man's
package.
Cardozo emphasizes, however, that "a like result would follow if
the interests were the same."' He provides the following illustration:
One who jostles one's neighbor in a crowd does not invade the rights
of others standing at the outer fringe when the unintended contact
casts a bomb upon the ground. The wrongdoer as to them is the
man who carries the bomb, not the one who explodes it without
suspicion of the danger.39
Therefore, even alloving that the railroad employees created a risk of
physical injury to the man boarding the train, there is still no nexus
between their activity and the injury to Mrs. Palsgraf. Her physical
injury was of a different kind than would be anticipated from pushing
a man aboard a train and knocking a package from his arm.
Palsgraf is relevant to the preconception tort analysis because it is a
leading case on duty which holds that not all harmful activity is
386. See Keeton et al., supra note 34, § 30, at 164.





actionable. If railroad employees triggering harm to a ticketed
passenger on a train platform is not actionable, it is understandable
why courts would be reluctant to allow claims for acts harmful to the
unconceived. This approach, however, assumes that duty is about
relationships between persons and not about logical connections
between types of activity and types of harm. Analyzing Prosser's
approach to duty helps to sharpen the distinction between these
competing conceptions of duty.
Prosser argues that courts, despite Palsgraf, routinely apply the
principle of transferred negligence.391 He poses a hypothetical in
which a delivery truck driver passes a visibly empty cardboard box in
a driveway:
Two minutes later, coming down the driveway, he negligently runs
over the box. Negligently, because he knows it is there, it may be
owned by some one, and it has some small value. In the meantime a
two-year-old child, whose presence could not reasonably be
anticipated, has concealed himself in the box. Is the defendant
liable for the death of the child?
I cannot believe that any court ever will say no.392
In Prosser's illustration, there is no special relationship between the
driver and the child, and it is not foreseeable from the driver's
perspective that the child could have entered the box. Therefore,
although the driver may have had a duty to avoid property damage to
the box, he cannot be said to have owed a duty of care to the child
obscured within. This assumes that foreseeability as a duty
determinant is a matter purely of foresight. As Professor Green has
argued, however, the announcing of a duty of care often involves
hindsight.393  It is the court's role to evaluate the facts and
circumstances of a case and make an after-the-fact judgment about
whether members of society should be under a duty of care in similar
circumstances in the future.
A comparison of the child-in-the-box hypothetical with Palsgraf
brings the contrasting analyses of Prosser and Cardozo into sharp
relief. On the facts of Prosser's hypothetical, a court would be
justified in announcing a duty of care, without resorting to transferred
negligence, because a driver should never run over a box large enough
to contain a child. It is foreseeable that a young child would be
attracted to a box as a plaything. It is also foreseeable that a young
child would climb inside a box that was big enough to accommodate
him. Although a reasonable person may not have contemplated the
391. See Prosser, supra note 380, at 19-24.
392- See id. at 20-21.
393. See Green, supra note 18, at 1418. See also Robertson, supra note 13, at 1437
(suggesting that Professor Green's hindsight approach is best suited to determining
the scope of duty in preconception tort cases).
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possibility of a child in the box, he should have done so. The court
plays a role in shaping careful behavior when it announces that drivers
are under a duty to guard against physical injury as well as property
damage when they encounter a large box on a road or driveway. One
can imagine that people who drive vehicles for a living are so advised
as part of their training. Framing it in terms of a nexus test for duty,
the question to be answered is as follows: Is there a connection
between driving over a large cardboard box and injuring a child? The
answer is yes, because the inclination of a child to play inside a box
creates a sufficient nexus between the driver's activity (running over a
box) and the child's manner of injury (getting run over while playing
inside a box). This case is easier than Palsgraf because the injury is
direct, and the proximate cause issues over which Judge Andrews
labored in the Palsgraf dissent are not present."
Although Palsgraf looks somewhat like the child-in-the-box
hypothetical, it differs in significant respects relevant to the finding of
duty. Absent notice of an explosive device, there is no nexus between
being too rough with someone while helping him aboard a train and
setting off an explosion that injures a woman standing nearby. If the
child-in-the-box case were the first of its kind, and the reviewing
court, finding a duty, upheld a cause of action for wrongful death,
word of the case would undoubtedly filter through the public and put
drivers on notice that they should swerve out of the way when they
encounter a box in the road, rather than heedlessly running it over. In
short, the public would be under a court-sanctioned duty to refrain
from driving over boxes for fear of killing children. In contrast, if
Cardozo had found a duty flowing to the plaintiff in Palsgraf, is it
likely that railroad employees would be on notice not to push or pull
teetering passengers aboard a train for fear that doing so might trigger
an explosion injuring someone a short distance away? Owing to its
sheer improbability, it is highly unlikely that the announcement of
such a duty would have any impact whatsoever, except perhaps to
overdeter railroad employees from coming to the assistance of
passengers.
The foregoing analysis bears particular relevance to the question of
duty in the preconception tort context because there can be no special
or prior relationship to an injured party who did not exist at the time
of a defendant's negligent act. Since a duty in such circumstances
cannot be predicated on a relationship between the individuals, it
must be predicated, if at all, on a nexus between the tortfeasor's
activity and the plaintiff's position in relation to that activity. In many
preconception tort categories, the finding of such a nexus, and a
correlative duty, is justified. In difficult cases, courts have been
reluctant to announce a duty of care because of their wish to limit
394. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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liability, but principles of proximate cause may serve this purpose.
Although it might seem to be a matter of mere semantics whether
courts choose to employ duty or proximate cause to restrict causes of
action, the choice is important. The duty element, as its name implies,
is a means by which the courts tell citizens that they are under an
obligation to exercise care so as not to harm others. 95 By rejecting
claims on grounds of proximate cause, courts can affirm the obligation
to exercise due care, while at the same time relieve defendants of
liability where the injury is too far removed or too clouded by
intervening events. The next section illustrates how the nexus test can
be put into practice in preconception tort cases.
B. Applying the Nexus Test for Duty to Preconception Cases
This part fleshes out the preconception tort analysis by applying the
nexus test for duty, articulated in the last section, to the various
factual contexts in which preconception tort cases arise. In fact, some
courts have already applied what appears to be a nexus test for duty,
even if they have not labeled it as such.396 While it is not feasible in
this Note to evaluate the particulars of every case within each general
category of preconception tort, it will suffice to apply the nexus test to
the facts of some typical cases in each category.
1. Negligent Surgery
The negligent performance of a Caesarean section leading to injury
of a subsequently-conceived child is a preconception claim that has
arisen in two cases.397 This factual scenario is easy to analyze under a
nexus test for duty because of the close connection between the
doctor's activity (cutting open and repairing a woman's uterus) and
the category of risk to the future child (suffering injury as a result of
premature birth due to rupture of a negligently-repaired uterus). The
facts of these cases bear some resemblance to Prosser's child-in-the-
box scenario.398 The case for a duty of care seems more compelling in
the hypothetical child-in-the-box case because of the certainty of
immediate injury if the box the driver runs over has a child in it. The
negligent Caesarean section cases, however, could be viewed as more
compelling from a duty standpoint in that there is a much greater
chance that there will be a child in the uterus, albeit removed in time.
The difficulty in permitting a cause of action has to do with the later-
395. See Keeton et al., supra note 34, § 53, at 356.
396. See, e.g., McNulty v. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Mass. 1993); Monusko v.
Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367,368-69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
397. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69, 88-97 for discussions of Bergstreser
v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978), and Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 517
N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), respectively.
398. See Prosser, supra note 380, at 20-21; see also supra text accompanying notes
391-92.
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conceived child's removal in time from the negligent act, suggesting
that if the claim is to be barred at all, it should be barred on grounds
of proximate cause.
A negligent preconception surgery case would be more difficult to
make if, in addition to the remoteness of the plaintiff in time, there
were also an attenuated connection between the category of the
surgical procedure and the harm to the unconceived child. For
example, let us assume that negligent performance of heart surgery on
a young woman leads to insufficient blood flow to a later-conceived
child. The child suffers brain damage as a result of improper blood
flow. While such an eventuality might appear somewhat foreseeable
in hindsight, the case for imposition of liability is weaker under a
nexus test for duty. The link between heart surgery on a young
woman and poor blood flow to a later-conceived child is less direct
and therefore less compelling than the link between uterine surgery
and premature birth of a subsequent child as a result of a weakened
uterus.
2. Rh Sensitization
With the exception of Renslow, 99 the Rh sensitization cases share a
similar factual background. A woman becomes pregnant with a baby
that has an incompatible Rh factor. If the woman's blood becomes
sensitized, an eventuality well known to the medical community, there
is a risk of injury to any later-conceived children with incompatible Rh
factors.' The doctors fail to take steps to prevent sensitization of the
mother's blood, and a few years later, a subsequently-conceived child
with an incompatible Rh factor suffers harm.
In this factual setting, the nexus between the doctor's activity
(failing to prevent sensitization of the mother's blood) and the child's
injury (birth defects as a result of sensitization) is compelling. The
link is formed by medical knowledge about the results of sensitization.
Once again, the cause of action is best restricted, if at all, on grounds
of causation, specifically supervening cause. If the prospective mother
has been advised, prior to conception, that her doctors negligently
failed to prevent sensitization in a prior pregnancy, then her act of
conceiving another child might be deemed a supervening cause of the
child's injury."' The close connection between the failure to prevent
sensitization and the risk of injury to subsequent children, however,
merits the finding of a duty of care.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 100-09 for a discussion of Renslow v.
Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977).
400. See Carlson, supra note 111, at 532-33.
401. See Lynch v. Scheininger. 744 A.2d 113, 119 (NJ. 2000).
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3. Failure to Immunize for Rubella
The two preconception tort cases involving failure to immunize
against rubella provide a nice illustration of the nexus test for duty. In
Monusko, the court found a duty of care to protect a future child from
fetal rubella syndrome where the defendant doctor was providing care
for the plaintiff's mother in connection with conceiving and bearing a
child.4" In McNulty, by contrast, the court found no duty of care to
guard against fetal rubella syndrome where the physician was
providing contraceptive care.403 The opposite outcomes of Monusko
and McNulty suggest that it is not the fact of a relationship between
the plaintiff's mother and the defendant that is the key to the
formation of a duty. Rather, it is the connection between the
defendant's activity and the potential harm to a later-conceived child.
The birth of the Monusko plaintiff, and harm from fetal rubella
syndrome, should have been within the contemplation of the
defendant doctor because he was providing care connected to
conception and childbearing. The same cannot be said of the McNulty
case, where the defendant physician was providing care aimed at
preventing the conception and birth of a child.
4. Pharmaceutical Products
Most of the preconception claims in the pharmaceuticals context
have arisen out of DES ingestion.4" A woman takes DES while
pregnant, causing her child to develop uterine tumors. The woman's
child, in turn, conceives and bears a child who suffers physical defects
as a result of the uterine tumors. The nexus between providing a drug
to prevent miscarriage and the birth of a grandchild suffering defects
would appear to fail a nexus test for duty. The duty element,
however, should not be as significant in this type of case because
principles of strict products liability apply, rendering the duty element
of diminished importance.4 5
There is one way, however, in which a relevant nexus might
nevertheless be established. Drug companies are charged with
guarding, through clinical trials, against a multitude of risks that might
be posed by their products.4° If the manufacturer should have known,
through proper clinical trials, that DES posed a risk of uterine tumors,
then the nexus is established. Once knowledge or constructive
402. See supra text accompanying notes 156-60 for a discussion of Monusko v.
Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
403. See supra text accompanying notes 161-66 for a discussion of McNulty v.
McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904 (Mass. 1993).
404. See supra Part I.B.2.
405. See Keeton et al., supra note 34, § 99, at 694-95.
406. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 §
505(a)-(e) (1938) (amended 1962).
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knowledge of the risk of uterine tumors in the child is established, the
nexus between the uterine tumors and the malformation of the future
child exposed to such tumors is no longer far-fetched. As with the
negligent surgery cases, the line might be drawn at defects closely
connected with the bodily integrity of a developing fetus. For
example, if DES caused heart defects rather than uterine tumors, it
would be difficult to establish a nexus between a mother's weak heart
and her child's developmental injury, even if actual causation could be
established in such a case.
5. Auto Accidents
The preconception auto accident cases have presented great
obstacles to plaintiffs, usually on the ground that a driver cannot owe
a duty of care to the future child of someone he injures through
negligent operation of an automobile.?7 The general reasoning is that
if a driver strikes another car with a female passenger inside, it is not
reasonably foreseeable that such a collision will do harm to a child
conceived by the woman at some future time. The Taylor court began
its analysis of such a case, appropriately, with a discussion of
Palsgraf.4  A comparison of the preconception auto accident cases
and the facts of Palsgraf is helpful in sorting out the duty issue. In
Palsgraf, there was no reasonable connection between dislodging a
train passenger's package and setting off an explosion resulting in
physical injury to a bystander.' The absence of a nexus between
defendant's category of activity and plaintiffs category of injury is not
as clear in the preconception car accident cases.
Of the types of injuries to be guarded against while driving a car, it
may be said that physical injury is the most important, with property
damage and emotional harm taking a back seat. Therefore, the
physical injury suffered by a preconception tort plaintiff is within the
primary type of harm a driver should guard against while operating a
vehicle. The difficulty arises in the manner of the injury. In a typical
car accident case, the driver has breached a duty to an existing person
who is usually within the range of visual apprehension at the time of
the accident. To say that a driver owes a duty to one not yet in
existence would appear to fulfill Cardozo's warning that "[1life will
have to be made over, and human nature transformed, before
prevision so extravagant can be accepted as the norm of conduct. '419 J
But the finding of a duty of care in this context is not as improbable as
it seems at first blush. A court might conclude that injury to a
407. See supra Part I.B.3.
40& See Taylor v. Cutler, 703 A.2d 294,298 (N.J. 1997).
409. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also supra text
accompanying notes 372-78 (discussing Palsgraf in greater detail).
410. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
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woman's uterus is among the risks of physical harm within the orbit of
negligent driving. If injury to a woman's uterus is a foreseeable harm,
this might create a close enough nexus between negligent driving and
injury to future children to justify the finding of a duty, admittedly a
matter of close judgment. By announcing a duty of care to guard
against harm to later-conceived children, a court would be merely
adding to an undoubtedly massive list of potential physical harms that
could flow from negligent driving, many of them improbable from the
standpoint of foresight. Even if the nexus test is not met, the fact that
driving carries with it an almost universal duty of care, reflected in a
system of mandatory insurance, counsels in favor of finding a duty in
most car accident cases.411
In order to construct a car accident roughly equivalent to Palsgraf,
we need to plant explosive material in the glove compartment of a car
struck by a negligent driver. Let us say that the negligent driver
strikes the other vehicle, injuring its driver, and the material in the
glove compartment explodes, causing injury to a pedestrian standing
on a nearby sidewalk. A court is unlikely to announce that drivers
have a duty of care to guard against harms to pedestrians caused by
dangerous explosives concealed in other motorists' cars. This type of
case is one in which the courts would be hard-pressed to announce a
duty. The hindsight perspective is once again instructive. A negligent
driver injuring both a woman and her subsequently conceived child
might, in hindsight, recognize that if he had the opportunity to do
things over again, he would have been mindful of the potential harm
to both injured parties. On the other hand, the negligent driver who
triggered the explosion injuring the pedestrian might justifiably feel
no obligation to guard against a similar harm in the future because it
was not connected closely enough with his negligent activity.
If the courts are troubled by the granting of a cause of action where
a driver's negligence gives rise to an injury to a child born many years
after the risky conduct, such a cause of action can be barred on
proximate cause grounds. By rejecting the cause of action on grounds
of proximate cause, a court can nevertheless affirm the idea that
drivers are under an obligation to guard against the harm. The finding
of a duty vindicates, to some extent, the claimant who argues that he
has been injured through wrongful conduct. Proximate cause is a
means for the court to deny a cause of action because of remoteness in
time or causal chain, not because of the absence of an obligation or
duty.
411. See Keeton et al., supra note 34, § 84, at 602-03.
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6. Toxic Substance Exposure
Cases involving toxic substance exposure are ones in which the duty
element is of the least importance. The release of toxic substances
that might potentially alter the chromosomal structure of human
beings and visit harms upon their children can be put in the category
of highly risky conduct for which strict liability should apply"
Although toxic substance exposure should create a cause of action for
any person who is injured as a result of the exposure, future children
are generally excluded from the class of plaintiffs who may recover. If
courts are to employ any duty analysis at all in such cases, there
certainly should be a duty on the part of toxic substance producers
and handlers to prevent multigenerational harms. Medical knowledge
about the connection between certain toxic substances and
chromosomal injuries supplies the required nexus. If a court is to
restrict the cause of action, it should be on grounds of proximate
cause, a doctrine less concerned with enforcing the appropriate level
of care and more concerned with limiting liability for harms mediated
by intervening events and the passage of time.
7. Assisted Reproduction: IVONT and ICSI
The nexus between a fertility specialist's use of an assisted
reproductive technique and the conception of a future child is
compelling. If a duty of care to a future person can exist, such a duty
is most obvious where a physician's activity is specifically directed at
bringing about the existence of the person. For this reason, the
cutting-edge assisted reproductive techniques WONT and ICSI pass
the nexus test for duty with flying colors. 3
Since the preconception duty of care is clear in assisted
reproduction cases, courts should focus on the elements of causation
and injury. In many cases, causation may be hard to prove because of
the possibility that naturally occurring genetic factors, and not the
fertility specialist's intervention, were responsible for a child's birth
defects. Even where causation is established, the plaintiff will have to
show that he suffered an actual injury by proving that he would have
been born unimpaired if the doctor had exercised due care. In a case
involving ICSI, a plaintiff might allege that fertilization by penetrating
an egg with an injection pipette was the cause of a birth defect. If the
plaintiff can show that he would have been born unimpaired had the
procedure been performed carefully, then the injury element will be
satisfied. If the plaintiff had no chance to be born healthy without
412. See id § 78, at 545-59, for a discussion of abnormally dangerous materials and
activities to which the strict liability rule applies in many English and American
jurisdictions.
413. For an in-depth discussion of WONT and ICSI, see supra Part II.B.
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ICSI, however, then the claim may be barred as one for wrongfullife.414
If a fertility clinic performs ICSI where the child had a chance to be
conceived through ordinary IVF, an interesting problem is presented.
The child can allege that her claim is not one for wrongful life because
there was at least a chance, albeit a small one, that the same sperm
and egg would have come together to create the same child if the
doctors had chosen regular IVF over ICSI. The child might choose
not to allege, as in a wrongful life claim, that she would prefer
nonexistence to her current condition. Rather, she might claim that
she would gladly have been born unimpaired through routine IVF,
rather than impaired through ICSI.
CONCLUSION
Preconception negligence is already a significant area of tort law.
Over the past thirty years, numerous plaintiffs have brought claims
alleging injuries resulting from negligent activity prior to their
conception. This area of the law promises to become even more
important as interventions affecting human reproduction at the
cellular level grow more feasible. To date, preconception tort cases
have usually arisen where defendants engaged in risky conduct, but
did not intend to have an impact on future persons. With the advent
of advanced assisted reproductive technologies like IVONT and ICSI,
as well as the possibility of inheritable genetic modification and
human cloning, the setting has shifted. It is now not only possible, but
also likely, that medical interventions targeted at creating or
enhancing future persons will cause injuries to some of those persons.
Gene therapy and assisted reproductive technologies that act upon
reproductive cells prior to conception hold out great promise, but they
also pose risks of harm. The time is ripe for courts to develop a
consistent approach to preconception negligence grounded in
traditional tort doctrine.
In the current state of the law, some courts are skeptical about
whether otherwise negligent actors can owe a duty of care to persons
not yet in existence. The plaintiff is hard pressed to establish a
relationship between himself and the defendant giving rise to a duty.
This obstacle can be overcome if courts focus on a different type of
relationship: the nexus between the category of activity in which the
defendant engaged and the category and manner of harm the plaintiff
suffered. In most types of cases presented thus far, and certainly in
cases involving assisted reproduction, such an approach will enable
the plaintiff to clear the duty hurdle. Courts may still limit causes of
action on grounds of proximate cause, but doing so does not involve a
414. For a discussion of wrongful life, see supra Part I.C.
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determination that the defendant had no obligation to avert the harm
suffered by the plaintiff. In some cases where recovery to date has
been denied, however, a focus on proximate cause rather than duty
may allow the plaintiff to be made whole where a remedy might
otherwise not have been available.
Notes & Observations
